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THE INTERNET IS CHANGING INTERNATIONAL LAW
HENRY H. PERRITI, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The Internet is changing international law because it is eroding
the dominance of traditional sovereign states at the same time that it
facilitates new institutional mechanisms for making, applying, and en-
forcing law. I have explained elsewhere how the Internet threatens
traditional sovereignty' and how the Internet itself can be a new kind
of sovereign. 2 This article explains how the Internet influences the
operation of other international institutions for making, applying, and
enforcing law, thus changing the forms and content of international
law.
The article begins by explaining the traditional distinctions
among different types of international law and arguing that those dis-
tinctions are becoming less meaningful. Part II describes some of the
major international institutions, to illustrate the rich set of law-
making and law-applying institutions that guide the evolution of in-
ternational law. Sometimes, scholars of international law talk as
though public international law were the only "real" category of in-
ternational law, thus marginalizing law related primarily to interna-
tional institutions or to private international law. Part I of this article,
explaining the erosion of the distinctions among international law
categories and describing the international institutions, should make
clear that this temptation is one to be resisted. Indeed, sovereignty
itself is becoming a diffuse concept, and understanding international
* Dean and Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, and Vice President for the
Downtown Campus of Illinois Institute of Technology. Dean Perritt is a member of the bars of
Virginia, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Illinois, and the United States Su-
preme Court. He expresses appreciation to Fred Abbott, Bart Brown, Kenneth Dam, Marcia
Dam, Steve DelRosso, Jack Goldsmith, Stuart Ingis, David Johnson, Roberta Katz, April Ma-
jor, John Murphy, David Post, and John Scheib for exposing him to many of the ideas devel-
oped in this article.
1. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT'L LEG.
STUD. 155, 156-71 (1997).
2. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy
or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 413,437-63 (1997).
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law as the body of norms and institutions guiding states must neces-
sarily be enlarged to accommodate new kinds of nongovernmental
organizations ("NGOs") performing traditional sovereign functions.
Part III of the article explains the NGO phenomenon.
Within Part III, the article draws theoretical direction from
"regime theory." Regime theory offers a synthesis that explains some
of the major trends in international law. That synthesis suggests that
democratization increases the potency of international law and that
cultural diffusion and interpenetration of formal legal decisions and
norms erode geographically based boundaries.
Part III of the article focuses mainly on the effect of the Internet.
It argues that the Internet accelerates all the phenomena shaping
international law by making it easier to access norms, that it
facilitates legal harmonization by improving access to models, that it
improves the operation of norm forming institutions, that it improves
the operation of enforcement institutions, and that it strengthens
NGOs.
The result will be a rich body of international law that comes into
play in almost every public or private dispute, made more accessible
by the Internet. The international political arena now is more varied
and open because of the strengthening of international law making
and law applying institutions. The strengthening of NGOs adds new
actors to political and legal processes at the international level, and
these new actors carry international norms to domestic political and
legal institutions. The Internet represents a new tool for these new
actors to use in the new arena. Because of low barriers to entry, the
new tools are less subject to monopoly control by states.
The final Part of the article summarizes necessary conditions for
the Internet to have this effect, emphasizing freedom of access to
public information and a competitive structure at every level of the
"stack" of communications and content elements of the world's
telecommunications and information infrastructure.
In a comment published in this volume, Professor Jack Gold-
smith challenges these propositions.3 I was quoted in the New York
Times in early 1998, referring to Professor Goldsmith: "Jack's skepti-
cism is useful because it forces some intellectual discipline on the rest
3. See Jack H. Goldsmith, Regulation of the Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1119, 1127-31 (1998) ("Fallacy III: Optimism About Cheap, Plentiful Informa-
tion").
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of us."'4 I said that and still believe it. Professor Goldsmith is con-
structive in his skepticism that the Internet will change the direction
of international law development. His skepticism forces greater dis-
cipline on my argument. But he gets the point of my article wrong.
The article does not argue that the Internet will change the direction
in which international law is evolving; it argues that the Internet will
accelerate evolution already underway because of other forces.
Harmonization, greater transparency, more democracy, and greater
influence by entities and groups of both supernational and subna-
tional scope already are quite evident. The Internet simply reinforces
them.
I. WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Three sources of international law exist: treaty law, customary in-
ternational law ("CIL"), and universal law or Jus Cogens. The first
two sources are consensual. A sovereign state can opt out by refusing
to sign a treaty or by manifesting its lack of consent for a norm of cus-
tomary international law. Jus Cogens is binding on all states regard-
less of their consent. Because of the unresolved controversies over
the source and legitimacy of international law-positivist in the sense
of based only on the legislative acts of sovereign states, or somehow
more generally based on the consent of the world community or some
body of natural law-many scholars dispute the existence of Jus Co-
gens.
A treaty is a contract among sovereign states. Like contracts,
many treaties not only establish norms, but also provide mechanisms
for delegated rule-making, adjudication, and enforcement. The
United Nations Charter is an example of a fairly complete treaty.
Treaties also can be irrevocable, as many view the constitutional
documents of the European Union, beginning with the Treaty of
Rome. In certain respects, treaty law is like contractual or statutory
law expressed through documents. Customary international law is
like the common law in some important respects. It is not expressed
in a document such as a treaty, but develops through the conduct of
states accompanied by Opinio Juris-a desire that the conduct give
rise to a binding norm. Unlike the common law, however, it is not a
product of judicial interpretation in the first instance, but rather the
4. Carl S. Kaplan, How to Govern Cyberspace: Frontier Justice or Legal Precedent?, N.Y.
TIMES CYBER L.J., (Mar. 27, 1998) <http://search.nytimes.com>.
19981
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actual practice of those who eventually become obligated to continue
their practice. It is thus equivalent to the doctrine in American labor
law that a sustained practice by labor and management supports an
inference that they intend their contractual relationship to include an
obligation to continue the practice,5 and the concept in contract law
that a course of dealing between contracting parties supports an in-
ference of the interpretation they give their contract.6
Because customary international law is consensual, states can ex-
empt themselves from a norm of customary international law by
manifesting an intent not to be bound by it. While customary interna-
tional law ordinarily addresses relations only between states, there
are some judicial expressions of the possibility that persons may enjoy
rights created by customary international law.'
The growing importance of customary international law, along
with treaty based law, has spawned a lively debate in American legal
literature as to whether federal courts should incorporate customary
international law into federal common law. Professor Goldsmith,
who writes elsewhere in this volume, has challenged the appropriate-
ness of such incorporation, arguing that it upsets the constitutional
balance by thrusting federal courts into a law-making role that should
be reserved to the political institutions of American government.8
Regardless of which side of the argument one finds most persuasive,
the argument would not be interesting without the emergence of cus-
tomary international law as a potent political and legal force.
International law conventionally is divided into public interna-
tional law, which regulates conduct among states (including the law of
war), and private international law.
5. [I]t is not unusual for the parties to a labor agreement to develop working relation-
ships, customs, and practices which are understood to be the norm, but which are no-
where reduced to a formal contract term. When long-standing practice ripens into an
established and recognized custom between the parties, it ought to be protected against
sudden and unilateral change as though it were a part of the collective-bargaining
agreement itself.
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Lodge 16 v. Burlington N. R.R., 802 F.2d
1016, 1022 (8th Cir. 1986).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981).
7. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708-09 (1900).
8. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of
International Law, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2260 (1998) (arguing that customary international law
should not be treated as federal law without authorization from the political branches).
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A. Public International Law
1. State-Centric Tradition
Traditional international law regulated relations among states,
while domestic ("municipal") law regulated relations between per-
sons and between persons and states.9 The UN Charter reinforces
this dualist notion by expressly preserving domestic jurisdiction.1°
The limited nature of public international law is expressed more pre-
cisely in the ideas (1) that only states and not persons enjoy rights un-
der international law and have standing to enforce them and (2) that
only states and not persons have obligations under international law.
Increasingly, treaties to which states are parties obligate the states to
enact laws imposing obligations on private citizens. The new Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
treaty on international bribery is a good example: "Each Party shall
take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a crimi-
nal offense under its law for any person.., to offer.., any undue pe-
cuniary or other advantage ... to a foreign public official ... in order
to obtain... improper advantage in the conduct of international
business.""
2. Law of War
The Law of War traditionally governed the conduct of military
forces in armed conflict.12 Human rights law gradually is being inte-
grated into the body of law applied by military authority, to protect
civilians against conduct by military personnel and to protect civilians
against other civilians in peace keeping and peace enforcement op-
erations (known in military circles as "Military Operations Other
9. The antecedents of this dualist theory of international law can be understood better by
recalling that international law arose in an era in which state sovereignty was vested in individ-
ual sovereigns who negotiated arrangements with other individual sovereigns, making up a web
of contracts among kings. Legal relations among kings could be distinguished from legal rela-
tionships among their subjects.
10. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (renouncing authority to intervene in domestic juris-
diction of states).
11. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, art. 1, para. 1; OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/bribery/20novle.htm>.
12. See Richard M. Whitaker, Civilian Protection Law in Military Operations: An Essay,
ARMY LAW., Nov. 1996, at 3 (Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-288) (explaining history
of law of war). See generally RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF
WAR 45-71 (1995) (reprinting "General Order 100" published during the U.S. Civil War as a
restriction on military conduct toward civilians).
1998]
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than War ("MOOTW")).13 The law of war is becoming a bridge be-
tween its state-centric origins and newer notions of human rights law.
While the source of the law of war is customary international law and
treaty law in the Geneva Conventions, it is usually expressed in Rules
of Engagement, promulgated and enforced by military authority in
the field.14
3. Human Rights
For centuries human rights were protected by public interna-
tional law in the sense that certain conduct by State A against citizens
of State B violated State A's obligations to State B under interna-
tional law. In the twentieth century, however, human rights law ex-
tended to protect citizens from their own governments, thus signifi-
cantly increasing permeability of the boundary between international
and domestic law. Such human rights concepts had their roots in the
Law of War, discussed supra, and flourished after the post-World
War II Nuremberg and Japanese War Crimes Tribunals applied hu-
man rights norms against individual German and Japanese officials,
after adoption of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Human rights concepts reached a new plateau with
the 1975 Helsinki Accords and the 1994 establishment of the Yugo-
slav War Crimes Tribunal by the UN Security Council.
One of the unsuccessful arguments made by Nazi war criminals
before the Nuremberg Tribunal was that they could not be found
guilty of violating norms against genocide and mistreatment of non-
combatants in war time because those obligations only bound states.
The Nuremberg Tribunal held that the norms also bind individuals.
In the Kadic case, the Second Circuit held that international human
rights norms also create rights that can be asserted by individuals at
least when national law so provides, 15 and that international law im-
poses obligations on individuals as well as states.16 In addition to
13. Contrast Whitaker, supra note 12, at 17 n.112, with id. at 18 n.123 (noting that interna-
tional law does not obligate peace keeping forces to take on all the responsibilities of a host
government).
14. See Marc L. Warren, Operational Law-A Concept Matures, 152 MIL. L. REV. 33, 52 &
n.83 (1996). Colonel Warren describes concepts and procedures for formulation of rules of en-
gagement in MOOTW. See id. at 51-52.
15. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'g, Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F.
Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
16. See id. at 239. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Reme-
dies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082 (1992) (arguing for individual rights approach
modeled on standing analysis under Administrative Procedure Act).
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these common law and customary law developments, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights clearly creates rights
owned by individuals and enforceable against individuals. 7
B. Private International Law
Private international law encompasses the subject usually known
to American lawyers as "conflict of laws.' 8 Somewhat whimsically
criticized by John Austin as not really being "international" even
though it admittedly constitutes "law," this body of principles con-
cerns the relationship among multiple sources of law originating in
different sovereign states.' 9 The principles typically affect the out-
come of private lawsuits. For example: A, a citizen of Bosnia, may
sue B, a citizen of Alabama, over a contract to perform computer
services in Bosnia. Regardless of whether the suit is filed in Alabama
Circuit Court, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, or a cantonal court in Bosnia, the court presented with the
lawsuit must decide whether to apply Bosnian, Alabaman, or federal
contract law. This is a "choice of law" problem.
Or, in the same contract dispute, a decision already may have
been rendered by a Bosnian cantonal court in a suit brought by A.
When B sues in Alabama Circuit Court, the Alabama court must de-
cide whether to recognize the Bosnian judgment and if so, whether to
give it preclusive affect or some lesser status. This is a judgment rec-
ognition and preclusion problem. Finally, in the foregoing example,
B, seeking to avoid recognition, may claim that the Bosnian court did
not have personal jurisdiction over him. In order to decide the rec-
ognition question, the Alabama court must determine limitations on
the jurisdiction that may be asserted by the Bosnian court.
To a considerable extent, resolution of the choice of law and the
personal jurisdiction questions implicate principles of state jurisdic-
tion founded in public international law. The substantive law of state
X cannot be applied to the controversy consistent with international
law unless state X has prescriptive jurisdiction over the controversy.
The personal jurisdiction issue cannot be resolved in favor of a de-
17. The Covenant obligates state parties to provide an "effective remedy" for violation of
rights recognized by the Covenant. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, art. 2(3)(a), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174.
18. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 21 (1991).
19. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2608-09 (1997) (review essay).
1998]
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termination that the Bosnian court had personal jurisdiction unless
Bosnia enjoys adjudicatory jurisdiction over the controversy, includ-
ing the parties. Determination of these matters is greatly simplified
by international arbitration when the parties exercise their power to
select both the substantive law and the forum. There is a trend in the
United States to respect party autonomy in choosing both substantive
law and forum.20
C. Unification of International Law
The boundary between public and private international law,
though often treated as distinct, in fact, always has been indistinct.
21
At the time of Jeremy Bentham, international law involved the per-
sonal relations of sovereigns, while the subject matter of today's pri-
vate international law was covered by municipal law. 22  Erosion of
natural law theories in preference for positivism widened the gap, re-
flected in the tension between monism and dualism in international
law theory.23  Monists sought unification.24  Dualists distinguished
sharply between public international law as the law of relations be-
tween states-mocked by John Austin, as not really "law," although
it was international- and private international law as the law gov-
erning persons-mocked by Austin as not really "international" al-
though it was "law." 25 Whether international law is part of domestic
20. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596-97 (1991).
21. See Hongju Koh, supra note 19, at 2609 (strong blending of public and private remained
key features of legal system even after Bentham and Austin began to lay the intellectual founda-
tions of dualism); Paul, supra note 18, at 25-26 (explaining how European scholars sought to
unify public and private international law even as Americans were separating them; conflicts can
be understood as species of public international law by treating them as a limitation on state
sovereignty).
22. See Mark W. Janis, Academic Workshop: Should We Continue to Distinguish Between
Public and Private International Law?, 79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 352 (1985) (moderated by
Michael Cardozo).
23. See Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States
and the European Union, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 556, 561-62 (1996-97) (explaining monism
and dualism).
24. See generally Bin Cheng, Introduction to Subjects of International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 23, 25 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed.,
1991) (monists, "led by Hans Kelsen, believe that international and municipal
law... [form] ... a single normative system" because the ultimate subject of all law is the indi-
vidual; dualists, led by H. Triepel and D. Anziolottyi, believe they are distinct legal systems).
Monism correlates with a natural law view. Dualism correlates with positivism. Monists believe
national courts are obligated to apply international law; dualists believe they apply international
law only when the national legislature has so provided. Thus there is a correlation between di-
rect effect and monism.
25. See Janis, supra note 22, at 352.
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law of a state is itself a question of domestic law.
Always, however, international commercial law straddled any
gap between the two types of international law, because it regulates
the activities of both individuals and states.26 Admiralty was a strong
example. Admiralty restricted the power of states against vessels
belonging to nationals of other states. It also was a source of individ-
ual right against vessels belonging to other individuals. The growing
importance of transnational business in the late decades of the twen-
tieth century and the increasing emphasis on international human
rights law in the same time period have stimulated a return to a more
unified view.27
Now any principled distinction between public and private inter-
national law is even more difficult to draw. As Part III explains, cus-
tomary international law, drawing not only from the practice of
states, but also from trade practice, is giving rise to a body of transna-
tional commercial law. Treaty based law is eclipsing customary inter-
national law as the most important source of law in the global con-
text. Treaty based organizations such as the World Trade
Organization ("WITO") and the International Telecommunication
Union ("ITU") adjust rights and relationships among private actors
and states and among private actors as much as they provide mecha-
nisms that adjust disputes among states. In the trade arena, nonstate
actors interact across national boundaries through international insti-
tutions such as the WTO and the World Bank, intensifying interpene-
tration of domestic and international legal systems.28 It is less clear
than it was fifteen years ago that compartmentalization of public in-
ternational law and private international law is helpful.
The monism/dualism dichotomy is giving way in the international
law literature to a more nuanced approach which recognizes both
theoretical and practical problems confronting a judge who would di-
rectly apply international law.29 Increasingly, domestic courts in the
26. See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 33, 35 (1996).
27. See Janis, supra note 22, at 353.
28. See Hongju Koh, supra note 19, at 2624 ("By the 1970s and '80s... [t]he growth of in-
ternational regimes and institutions, the proliferation of nonstate actors, and the increasing in-
terpenetration of domestic and international systems inaugurated the era of 'transnational rela-
tions,' defined by one scholar as 'regular interactions across national boundaries arising when at
least one actor is a non-state actor or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an
intergovernmental organization."' (quotations omitted)).
29. See Abdelkader Boye, The Application of the Rules of International Public Law in Mu-
nicipal Legal Systems, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS, supra note
1998]
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United States are pressed to consider international legal norms along
with purely domestic norms in deciding cases. 30 Although some
American courts have declared international law to be part of domes-
tic U.S. law,31 the more usual approach is to presume that Congress
intends for U.S. statutory law to be interpreted as consistent with in-
ternational law.32 Well recognized principles determine whether trea-
ties to which the United States is a party have "direct effect" (i.e. can
be applied directly as sources of law in domestic cases), but otherwise
reflect some reticence in wholesale incorporation of international le-
gal norms into the domestic legal order. 33 Some states, however, di-
rectly and explicitly incorporate some or all of international law into
their domestic legal systems.34 One barrier to the application of in-
ternational law in domestic court systems is the difficulty of gaining
knowledge of international law.35
Conclusion
Drawing from the use of different sources- treaties, customary
international law, and Jus Cogens, and synthesizing the previously
distinct categories of public international law, human rights law, and
private international law, the body of international law now has be-
come a relatively seamless web. Any given dispute may involve
norms and institutional mechanisms originally associated with a sepa-
rate source of law.
24, at 289.
30. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352,1355 (1998) (holding that failure to assert Vienna
Convention claim in state court waived it); Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that Alien Tort Claims Act incorporates international law violations).
31. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd
on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398, 422 (1964) (holding that international law may be part of U.S.
law in some circumstances).
32. This follows the so-called "Charming Besty canon." See Curtis A. Bradley, The
Charming Besty Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of Interna-
tional Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 482 (1998) (exploring U.S. constitutional implications of doctrine
that U.S. statutes should be interpreted so as to be consistent with international law).
33. See Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1355 (rejecting international law claim to prevent execution of
prisoner; claim was waived by failure to present in state court); In the Matter of Surrender of
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, 988 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (denying extradition pursuant to
arrest warrant issued by international tribunal).
34. See BULG. CONST. art. 5(4) (adopted 1991) (providing that international treaties rati-
fied by Bulgaria have the force of domestic law and supersede contrary provisions of national
law); KONST. RF art. 15 (adopted 1993) ("The commonly recognized principles and norms of
international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a component part
of its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules
than those stipulated by law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply.")
35. See Boye, supra note 29, at 291.
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II. NORMS AND INSTITUTIONS
Any legal system comprises norms and institutions. These cor-
relate with the primary and secondary rules of Hart.36 International
law is no exception. Historically, public international law emphasized
norms more than institutions, although this had begun to change by
the middle of the 19th century. Private international law emphasized
institutions more than norms because of its deference to party auton-
omy. Private parties developed and expressed their own norms which
then could be applied within an institutional framework defined by
private international law.
Public international law has evolved from a fairly complete set of
norms and a thin institutional framework into a much more complete
set of norms and institutions to guide state behavior. Public interna-
tional law institutions have evolved from a framework for political in-
teraction into more complex institutions that apply law. Norms have
existed since Grotius or before. Institutional arrangements for ap-
plying international law are no older than the turn of the century.
While the League of Nations was a relatively complete institutional
system, the League of Nations institutional structure was political
more than legal. The UN charter takes on a more legal character
and, as section B of this Part explains, other institutional arrange-
ments for public international law in the trade area have proliferated
in the last few decades. The World Trade Organization is a particu-
larly clear example. Regional trade arrangements such as the North
American Free Trade Association ("NAFTA") and the Mercosur are
other examples. The European Union involves not only mechanisms
for adjudicating disputes between states but also devolution of state
sovereignty over disputes and rights of persons.
International arbitration was the first international public law in-
stitution. It originated in papal arbitration and grew in prominence in
arbitration agreements that solved disputes resulting from the Ameri-
can Revolution and the War of 1812. 37 It reached a high-water mark
of support in the post-Civil War Alabama arbitration, when an inter-
36. But see James Paul Maniscalco, Note, The New Positivism: An Analysis of the Role of
Morality in Jurisprudence, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 989, 1021 (1995) ("Raz does not fundamentally
disagree with Hart's concept of a legal system of primary and secondary rules, but he fills in
these relatively abstract terms with concrete definitions. This makes explicit the inherent inter-
relationships between rules which were not recognized by Hart.").
37. See Henry T. King., Jr. & James D. Graham, The Origins of Modern International Ar-




national panel awarded the United States damages against Great
Britain,38 which resulted in establishment of predecessors of the
World Court shortly after the turn of the century.3 9
Private international law, conversely, began with institutional (or
at least procedural) arrangements and evolved into concerns with
transnational norms. This can be explained by the erosion of support
for natural law views, and preference for positivist views of law. Un-
less sovereign states express their sovereign will in favor of interna-
tional norms, none can exist. Accordingly, treaty frameworks had to
be erected first, through which the sovereign will can be expressed, in
order to "legislate" in the private law arena.
Now, harmonization supplements truly international private law
norms. Through the process of harmonization, individual states
adopt legal norms that are the same as those adopted by other states.
The result is as if there were a single body of international private law
or norms, but the source of the norms is the sovereign state and is,
therefore, legitimate. There is, however, a body of private interna-
tional law norms not originating in state legislation or common law:
the growing body of the international commercial law applied by ar-
bitrators and national courts looking to customary international law40
and trade practice 41 as the source of norms.
While no comprehensive governmental institutions exist to make
or enforce international law, treaty-based "regimes" exist in a num-
ber of specialized areas.42 They exist, among other things, to facilitate
the handling of mail from country to country, as in the case of the
Universal Postal Union; to channel funds for development, in the
case of the World Bank; to provide frameworks for periodic negotia-
tion of new treaty provisions and to maintain a secretariat for existing
38. See id. at 48 (describing Alabama Claims Arbitration under Treaty of Washington).
39. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Performance and Prospects of the World Court, 6 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 253, 253-56 (1994) (providing history of international arbitration as precursor of
international court); Heidi K. Hubbard, Note, Separation Of Powers Within The United Nations:
A Revised Role for the International Court of Justice, 38 STAN. L. REV. 165, 170 (1985-86) (de-
scribing history of international arbitration between states, dating back to Jay Treaty of 1794);
see also Eric C. Bruggink, The "Alabama" Claims, 57 ALA. LAW. 339, 342 (1996) (describing
early arbitration treaties).
40. Customary international law is based on the practice of states.
41. Trade practice is based on the practice of private traders.
42. See Official Web Site Locator for the United Nations System of Organizations (visited
Feb. 11, 1999) <http://www.unsystem.org/index8.htnl> (containing a list of organizations within
the United Nations system); see generally 2 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER (Oscar Schachter
& Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995) (providing a careful analysis of many of the organizations
listed at <http://www.unsystem.org/index8.html>).
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treaty provisions, in the case of the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization ("WIPO"); and to administer treaty-based rules and to fill
in the interstices, in the case of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization and the International Telecommunication Union. Other
international regimes such as the OECD and the Group of Seven
("G7") simply provide frameworks for high level discussions on issues
of mutual interest. These organizations are primarily economic in
character. Other regimes focus on security matters, including the Or-
ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO").
The UN plays both economic and security functions, with secu-
rity matters centered in the Security Council, human rights matters
delegated to the Commissioner for Human Rights, refugee matters
delegated to the High Commissioner for Refugees, and social and
economic matters within the province of the Economic and Social
Council. The General Assembly plays an overall advisory function,
and the Secretary General is the chief administrator.
In evaluating the institutions, it is useful to consider which ones
perform which of the three traditional governmental functions: adju-
dication, rulemaking, and enforcement.43 International rulemaking is
manifested in two ways: treaties that simply express norms, and those
that provide ongoing institutional mechanisms for further rule nego-
tiation or delegate the authority to promulgate rules for treaty-
authorized bodies.
Today, the web of treaty-based law provides a foundation for
new trans-national legal mechanisms.
Anne Marie Slaughter puts it well:
The state is not disappearing, it is desegregating into its separate,
functionally distinct parts. These parts-courts, regulatory agen-
cies, executives, and even legislatures--are networking with their
counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that consti-
tutes a new, transgovernmental order. Today's international prob-
lems-terrorism, organized crime, environmental degradation,
money laundering, bank failure, and securities fraud-created and
sustain these relations. Government institutions have formed net-
works of their own, ranging from the Basle Committee of Central
Bankers to informal ties between law enforcement agencies to legal
networks that make foreign judicial decisions more and more fa-
miliar. 44
43. The adjudication, rulemaking, and enforcement functions correlate with the judicial,
legislative, and executive functions of government.
44. Anne Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997).
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The institutions described in the following sections reflect and
provide the mechanisms for this transgovernmental order.
A. Norm Treaties
This section identifies treaty-based norms and considers more
elaborate institutional arrangements to provide for future rulemak-
ing, adjudication, and enforcement.
1. Law of War Conventions
The Hague and Geneva Conventions express norms regarding
the commencement of war and protecting noncombatants in war.45
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights obli-
gates its signatories to recognize a number of enumerated human
rights, ranging from self-determination, through non-discrimination
and free expression to procedural due process.46
3. Intellectual Property Agreements-Paris Convention, etc.,
Predating TRIPS
The Paris Convention harmonized standards for patent protec-
tion by signatories, the Rome and Berne Conventions did the same
thing for copyright protection, and the Paris and Madrid Conventions
cover trademarks.
B. Newer Multilateral Treaties Provide Institutional Frameworks:
Global or Nearly Global Institutions
The proliferation and strengthening of international law making
and law applying institutions matter because they make international
45. Convention-Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 is the most comprehensive. The first Hague peace conference was
held in 1899. The term "Geneva Conventions" refers to the four conventions of 1949: Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GWS]; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GWS Sea]; Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC].
46. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
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law more sophisticated, translating abstract norms into concretely ap-
plicable rules. Anything, including information technology, that im-
proves functioning of these institutions increases the influence and
practical significance of international law.
1. United Nations
The United Nations ("UN") is the broadest international institu-
tion. It expresses important norms and provides global machinery for
further rulemaking, adjudication, and enforcement.4 7 Its members in-
clude some 185 nations, and membership in the UN is widely re-
garded as an essential attribute of being a sovereign state. 48 The UN's
structure and powers are defined by the 1947 Charter, which has not
been subject to material change since its original adoption.49
With respect to lawmaking, the General Assembly is widely re-
garded as being capable of articulating principles of customary inter-
national law,50 although it lacks the power to adopt binding rules.51
The Security Council regularly adopts prospective rules for particular
threats to international peace and security. 2 Many subordinate bod-
47. See generally 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER, supra note 42, at 1-32. The phrases
"World Government" or "government" set off political alarm bells because they imply a loss of
sovereignty. The phrases are used in this article in a purely descriptive sense, signifying per-
formance of mandatory legal functions across sovereign boundaries. See generally Paul Szasz,
General Law Making Processes, in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER, supra note 42, at 69-107
(considering rulemaking); see also Carl-August Fleischhauer, Inducing Compliance, in 1
UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER, supra note 42, at 231-241 (considers enforcement in the con-
text of Security Council practice); Louis B. Sohn, The UN System as Authoritative Interpreter of
Its Law, in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER, supra note 42, at 229 (considers interpretation,
the core of adjudication).
48. See Angeline G. Chen, Taiwan's International Personality: Crossing the River by Feeling
The Stones, 20 LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 223, 245 (1998) (referring to UN membership as
indicator of sovereignty for Taiwan).
49. See U.N. CHARTER.
50. Customary international law is one of three sources of international law. Based on ac-
tual practice of states, it is distinguished from treaty law and Jus Cogens.
51. See Roger S. Clark, United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287, 298 (1995) (implying lack of law-
making power in General Assembly, by explaining how General Assembly exercises political
influence over true lawmaking bodies); John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundation of Interna-
tional Law: From State Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 433, 466 (1997) (ar-
guing that the effect of consent should be understood as an acceptance of the General Assembly
resolution).
52. One can argue that these rules are more remedy oriented in particular cases and thus
more closely associated with adjudication than rulemaking. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR
2981st mtg. (1991) (post cease-fire Iraq resolution). UN Security Council Resolution 1244
authorizes an international "civil presence" in Kosovo with extensive powers to establish an in-
terim civil government, necessarily including rulemaking powers. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N.
SCOR 4011st mtg. (1999).
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ies of the UN also make rules, including the UN Committee on Inter-
national Trade and Law ("UNCITRAL"), which has successfully
promulgated a variety of model agreements and statutes in the inter-
national commercial law arena. (UNCITRAL makes rules only in
the sense that UNCITRAL models are likely to be enacted by state
legislative bodies.) Lawmaking in these contexts is usually different
from lawmaking in legislative assemblies or administrative agencies
with rulemaking power. Assemblies and agencies exercise power
delegated to them through constitutions or organic statutes. The UN
bodies, like most other international lawmaking institutions, consti-
tute a forum in which state representatives can negotiate. Treaty ne-
gotiation is a rulemaking or legislative process, in the same sense that
negotiation over the terms of a statute53 or development of an agency
rule 4 are legislative processes. 55 While the results of the UN's human
rights enforcement activities have been mixed at best, its commitment
to the concept, and the availability of the General Assembly as a de-
bating forum, ensures that the UN cannot be ignored in the rule-
making context.56
In the adjudication context, the International Court of Justice
("ICJ"), defined and established by the UN Charter, is available to
adjudicate interstate disputes among nations. Although its use and
speed has been widely criticized, the International Court of Justice
has decided a number of disputes, compliance with its decisions is
high, and there is a trend toward greater use of the ICJ.57 Serious
consideration is also being given to proposals for a permanent inter-
national criminal court.58
53. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., And the Whole Earth Was of One Language: A
Broad View of Dispute Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REv. 1049 (1984).
54. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation
of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L. J. 1625,
1631-32 (1986).
55. See Szasz, supra note 47, at 70-80 (enumerating norm setting processes in international
arena and explaining that formulation of a treaty text is a negotiation process, resembling nego-
tiation within national legislative processes).
56. See Hurst Hannum, Human Rights, in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER, supra note
42, at 319-325 (arguing that UN has been very successful as a law-making institution in the hu-
man rights field).
57. See James H. Carter, Perspective: Section Tribute to the United Nations, 29 INT'L LAW.
295, 295-97 (1995) (Part I of the "Report on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations
in Advancing the Rule of Law in the World" recommends that United States accede to ICJ ju-
risdiction.); Robert Y. Jennings, The International Court of Justice After Fifty Years, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 493, 493-96 (1995).
58. See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 416-29 (1998);
James H. Carter, Perspective: Section Tribute to the United Nations, 29 INT'L LAW. 300, 300-01
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Enforcement is intimately related to international security be-
cause both address the use of force. The UN Charter provides an
overarching treaty law framework for almost any interesting intrare-
gional security arrangement. 9 Moreover, the UN Security Council
has strong enforcement powers, which regularly have been used since
their establishment. Tens of thousands of peacekeeping troops are in
the field at the present time, and UN efforts to pacify the former
Yugoslavia have been notable.6° Although the UN's enforcement re-
cord is mixed in Yugoslavia and Somalia, the Security Council's posi-
tion under the Charter ensures its involvement in significant intrare-
gional security arrangements. The UN's potential as an enforcement
institution could be enhanced by the organization of an Article 43
military force that could be used more effectively by the Security
Council or implementation of proposals for international police
forces .61
2. World Trade Organization
The WT0 62 was established by the Uruguay Round of Negotia-
tions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATI").
It is aimed at strengthening the rulemaking and adjudicatory func-
(1995) (Part II addresses the International Criminal Court); Ilia B. Levitine, Constitutional As-
pects of an International Criminal Court, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 27 (1996) (suggesting that long-
standing U.S. objections to court can be overcome); Michael P. Scharf, Comment, The Politics
of Establishing an International Criminal Court, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 167, 167-70 (1995)
(noting the majority of UN member nations support a permanent international criminal court as
opposed to ad hoc international tribunals).
59. Chapter 8 of the Charter recognizes regional security arrangements, and contemplates
their integration with Security Council activities. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 52-54. Article 23 of
the UN Charter imposes an obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means, and article 52 obli-
gates UN members "to make every effort to achieve specific settlement of local disputes
through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the
Security Council." Id. art. 52, para. 2. Also, article 52 obligates the Security Council to encour-
age the development of dispute settlement through regional arrangements. See id. art. 52, para.
3. But Article 53 prohibits enforcement action by regional arrangements "without the authori-
zation of the Security Council." Id. art. 53, para. 1.
60. Peacekeeping missions differ from pacification missions such as Yugoslavia. See Olara
A. Otunnu, The Peace and Security Agenda of the United Nations: From Crossroads into the
Next Century (visited July 14, 1998) <http://www.cgg.ch/olara.htm> (paper published by Com-
mission on Global Governance).
61. See ROBERT B. OAKLEY ET AL., POLICING THE NEW WORLD DISORDER: PEACE
OPERATIONS AND PUBLIC SECURITY (1998); John F. Murphy, What Ever Happened to the New
World Order, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 561, 564-65 (1995) (discussing and explaining advantages of per-
manent UN force under article 43 of the UN Charter); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Policing Interna-
tional Peace and Security: International Police Forces, WIS. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1999).
62. See WTO Website (last modified July 10, 1998) <http://www.wto.org>.
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tions of the international trade regime. 63 There are 134 signatories to
the agreement that created the WTO, all of whom have agreed to the
WTO's jurisdiction as defined in the Uruguay Round.64
The WTO's rulemaking functions derive from its responsibility
for organizing multilateral trade negotiations, which specifically in-
clude recently completed negotiations over trade in computer soft-
ware and chips, telecommunications, and financial services. Not only
tariffs are impacted by these rules. The Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property annex to the Uruguay Round signifi-
cantly harmonized copyright, patent, and trademark law on an inter-
national basis, and significantly changed American law in all three ar-
eas.65 Obligations to give most favored nation and national treatment
with respect to non-tariff as well as tariff impediments to foreign
competitors represent a powerful lever to change national legislation
and regulations.66
One of the major incentives to create the WTO was the need for
stronger dispute settlement machinery. The WTO superintends a
multi-level dispute settlement quasi-arbitration process that applies
WTO rules, while leaving it to the national policy of member states to
enforce decisions by imposing trade sanctions or stripping WTO
membership.67
3. G7/P8
G7 was originally an informal collection of heads of state of the
United States, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, the
European Union, and Canada.68 However, G7's activities are often
63. The World Trade Organization, established by the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (part of the Uruguay Round), also has the power to interpret the WTO
agreement by 3/4 vote of its members. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Ne-
gotiations, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
64. See Organization Members (last modified Dec. 21, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/
about/organsn6.html> (listing 133 members, 35 observers, and 7 observers to the General Coun-
cil).
65. See Final Act (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/finalact.htm> (pro-
viding link to Annex 1C to WTO agreement).
66. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Standard for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DSD/9 (May 20, 1996), available in 1996 WL 908728.
67. See generally Final Act (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/
finalact.htm> (providing link to Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, annex 2 to WTO agreement).
68. The name G7 was first used after the London Summit of 1977. See From G7 to G8 (last
modified July 20,1998) <http://www.library.utoronto.ca/www.g7.what-is-g7.htm>.
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extended to include Russia.69  Lacking a formal organic statute or
constitution, G7/P8 also lacks formal rulemaking, adjudicatory, or en-
forcement powers. Nevertheless, the high level at which it functions
has positioned it well to articulate principles and norms in certain ar-
eas on an ad hoc basis, which other institutions then often translate
into more detailed operational documents. Presently, focal points of
G7/P8 members are to work out rules on terrorism and drug control,
and to figure out how to regulate the Internet. 70
4. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD")7 originally was organized to administer the Marshall
Plan7 and comprises most of the developed countries. 73 Originally a
consultative and advisory body only,74 the OECD performed no for-
mal treaty-making, adjudicatory, or enforcement functions; in the last
decade, however, the OECD has emerged as a significant rulemaking
forum.75 For instance, the United States has relied on the OECD to
begin working out a multinational policy on software encryption.7 6
69. Increasingly, the summit including Russia is simply referred to as "G8." See id. (ex-
plaining that G7 was called P8 when Russia joined discussions in 1994).
70. See generally G7 Pilot Projects (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http://www.ispo.cec.be/g7/
projidx.html> (describing information society projects arising out of Brussels summit). A
committee of experts prepared material for higher level G7 consideration pertaining to harmful
uses of the Internet. The author was a member of the committee of experts, and the author
participated in the discussions referenced in the text.
71. See OECD Online (last modified July 14,1998) <http://www.oecd.org>.
72. See generally Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, PARIS 14th December 1960 (visited July 14, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/about/
trans-ht/conventn.htm>.
73. Members as of mid-1997 and their date of membership include: Australia (1971), Aus-
tria (1961), Belgium (1961), Canada (1961), Czech Republic (1995), Denmark (1961), Finland
(1969), France (1961), Germany (1961), Greece (1961), Hungary (1996), Iceland (1961), Ireland
(1961), Italy (1961), Japan (1964), Korea (1996), Luxembourg (1961), Mexico (1994), New Zea-
land (1973), The Netherlands (1961), Norway (1961), Poland (1996), Portugal (1961), Spain
(1961), Sweden (1961), Switzerland (1961), Turkey (1961), United Kingdom (1961), and United
States (1961). See OECD Online (last modified July 14, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/
about/membercountries.html>.
74. See About OECD: The OECD and its Origins (visited July 14, 1998) <http://
www.oecd.org/about/origins.htm>.
75. Nevertheless, the OECD is actively involved in working out a treaty on multilateral
investment. See The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (visited Sept. 21, 1998) <http://
www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/maindex.htm>.
76. See OECD, Report on Background and Issues of Cryptography Policy (last modified
Dec. 19, 1997) <http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/crypto3.htm> (discussing divergent
national approaches). The author was actively involved in discussing U.S. policy with White
House and agency officials during 1995 and 1996 and knows from those conversations that the
U.S. government hoped to persuade the OECD to embrace an approach that requires key es-
crow. Those hopes were not realized.
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The OECD also has undertaken the development of multinational
rules for other aspects of electronic commerce, including digital signa-
tures and a trusted third party infrastructure. 7
OECD also has developed a mechanism for resolving disputes
over nationalization of private investment.7 8 The evolving OECD
dispute resolution mechanisms supplement cumbersome machinery
for ICJ adjudication over rights of foreign direct investors under
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation ("FCN") treaties.7 9 It also
simplifies arbitration over investment disputes under an elaborate
web of bilateral investment treaties. 8° Commentators propose an
OECD dispute resolution approach modeled on NAFTA, allowing
investor-state arbitration in addition to state-to-state dispute resolu-
tion.8'
5. World Intellectual Property Organization
The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")82
("OMPI" in French and Spanish) "was established by a convention
signed at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, entitled 'Convention Estab-
lishing the World Intellectual Property Organization...' [which] en-
tered into force in 1970."83 WIPO succeeded the functions of a vari-
ety of organizations originally established in the Paris and Berne
conventions of the late nineteenth century.8" WIPO is an intergov-
77. See id. (listing information technology security projects, including encryption).
78. See Christopher N. Camponovo, Dispute Settlement and the OECD Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 181 (1996).
79. See id. at 186-88 (reviewing experience in ICJ litigation over rights based on FCN
treaties); see also Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions-Text of the Convention (last modified Dec. 11, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/
cmisfbribery/20novle.htm> (OECD Anti-Bribery Guidelines).
80. See Camponovo, supra note 78, at 192-93 (reviewing experience under bilateral invest-
ment treaty arbitration clauses).
81. See id. at 212.
82. See generally WIPO Home Page (visited July 14, 1998) <http://www.wipo.org>.
83. WIPO History (visited July 14, 1998) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/general/wipo/
wipo.htm>.
84. The origins of WIPO derive from the adoption of the Paris Convention for the Protec-
tion of Industrial Property in 1883 and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works in 1886. "Both Conventions provided for the establishment of an 'International
Bureau' or secretariat. The two Bureaus were united in 1893 and functioned under various
names until 1970 when they were replaced by the International Bureau of Intellectual Property
(commonly designated as 'the International Bureau') by virtue of the WIPO Convention." Id.
WIPO centralizes the administration of the various intellectual property "unions" in the Inter-
national Bureau in Geneva-the secretariat of WIPO. Centralization ensures economy for the
member states and the private sector concerned with intellectual property. "WIPO became a
specialized agency in the United Nations system of organizations in 1974." Id.
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ernmental organization with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland; its
principal function is rulemaking. 5 It is one of the sixteen specialized
agencies of the United Nations' system of organizations.86  WIPO
promotes the protection of intellectual property throughout the
world, and administers multilateral treaties dealing with the legal and
administrative aspects of intellectual property.8 7  The number of
States that were members of WIPO was 171 as of September 21, 1998.
In addition, six States were parties to treaties administered by WIPO
but had not yet become members of WIPO.S8
WIPO enjoys significant rulemaking responsibility and currently
is the focus of US-stimulated efforts to negotiate a new multilateral
85. See Szasz, supra note 47, at 69.
86. WIPO has, since January 1, 1996, an agreement with the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WVTO), which is not a member of the United Nations system of organizations.
The agreement provides for cooperation between the International Bureau of WIPO
and the Secretariat of WTO in respect of assistance to developing countries and in re-
spect of the notification and collection of the intellectual property laws and regulations
of WTO members ....
WIPO History (visited July 14, 1998) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/general/wipo/wipo.htm>.
87. On January 1, 1997, WIPO administered the following Unions or treaties (listed in
the chronological order of their creation): in the field of industrial property, the Paris
Union (for the protection of industrial property), the Madrid Agreement (for the re-
pression of false or deceptive indications of source on goods), the Madrid Union (for
the international registration of marks), the Hague Union (for the international deposit
of industrial designs), the Nice Union (for the international classification of goods and
services for the purposes of the registration of marks), the Lisbon Union (for the pro-
tection of appellations of origin and their international registration), the Locarno Un-
ion (for the establishment of an international classification for industrial designs), the
PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) Union (for cooperation in the filing, searching and
examination of international applications for the protection of inventions where such
protection is sought in several countries), the IPC (International Patent Classification)
Union (for the establishment of worldwide uniformity of patent classification), the Vi-
enna Union (for the establishment of an international classification of the figurative
elements of marks), the Budapest Union (for the international recognition of the de-
posit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure), the Nairobi Treaty (on
the protection of the Olympic symbol), the TLT (Trademark Law Treaty) (for the sim-
plification of formalities before trademark registries), and, in the field of copyright or
neighboring rights, the Berne Union (for the protection of literary and artistic
works) ... the Rome Convention (for the protection of performers, producers of pho-
nograms and broadcasting organizations; administered in cooperation with Unesco and
International Labor Office (ILO)), the Geneva Convention (for the protection of pro-
ducers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms), and the
Brussels Convention (relating to the distribution of programme-carrying signals trans-
mitted by satellite).
Id.
88. See Cooperation with Developing Countries (visited July 14, 1998) <http://
www.wipo.org/eng/general/wipo/wipo.htm#history>; World Intellectual Property Organization
(visited Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/dgtext.htm>. As of September 21, 1998, there




treaty extending copyright protection in cyberspace.89 Regardless of
the merits of the proposed treaties, WIPO has proven remarkable ef-
fectiveness as a forum for working out multilateral treaties in the in-
tellectual property area. However, it lacks adjudicatory or enforce-
ment powers.
6. UNCITRAL
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law90
was established in 1966 as a mechanism for removing obstacles to in-
ternational trade arising from differences in commercial law between
trading states. It has emerged as a powerful instrument for harmo-
nizing transnational commercial law. Also, it has provided the
mechanism for negotiation of model texts on: international commer-
cial arbitration and conciliation, international sale of goods and re-
lated transactions, cross-border insolvency, international payments,
international transport of goods, electronic commerce, public pro-
curement, and international construction contracts.91
7. ICAO
The International Civil Aviation Organization 9 has formal leg-
islative authority for governing civil aviation over the high seas and
for setting certain airworthiness and logbook standards. 93
8. ITU
The International Telecommunication Union94 administers trea-
ties relating to telecommunications and provides a framework for ne-
gotiating treaty amendments. The ITU's standards are one of the
most effective forms of "soft law. ' '95 The ITU not only allocates radio
89. See Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions
(visited Oct. 21, 1998) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/main.html> (text of two proposed treaties
adopted December 20, 1996).
90. See generally UNCITRAL (visited July 14, 1998) <http://www.un.or.at/uncitral/
index.html>.
91. See UNCITRAL- General Information (visited July 14, 1998) <http://www.un.or.at/
uncitral/english/commiss/geninfo.htm>.
92. See generally International Civil Aviation Organization (visited July 14, 1998) <http://
www.icao.int>.
93. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Specialized Law-Making Processes, in 1 UNITED NATIONS
LEGAL ORDER, supra note 42, at 136.
94. See generally International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Home Page (visited July
27, 1998) <http://www.itu.ch>.
95. See Kirgis, supra note 93, at 152 (explaining that most states follow International Con-
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frequencies and sets technical standards; it also resolves questions
about allocating scarce geostationary orbit slots. 96
9. DOALOS
The Law of the Sea Convention established the seabed tribunal,
the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the
Sea. 97 "One of the most extraordinary features of the Convention is
the decision... to provide for compulsory arbitration or adjudication
of disputes. 98
10. Bretton Woods Institutions
The Bretton Woods conference at the end of World War II reor-
ganized international machinery for financial cooperation, currency
exchange, and capital markets. The two central institutions devel-
oped out of the Bretton Woods system are the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.
a. World Bank
The World Bank" exercises strong enforcement powers through
its lending decisions. It has established an international center for
settling international investment disputes through arbitration.1°° It
exercises strong enforcement powers through its lending decisions.
b. IMF
The International Monetary Fund'0' was created on December
27, 1945. Its purpose was:
sultative Committee on Telephone and Telegraph recommendations even though they are not
binding in a formal sense).
96. See Francis Lyall, Posts and Telecommunications, in 2 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL
ORDER, supra note 42, at 789, 815-16.
97. See generally Oceans and Law of the Sea Home Page (visited June 27, 1998) <http://
www.un.org/Depts/los>.
98. Bernard H. Oxman, The Law of the Sea, in 2 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER, supra
note 42, at 671, 693.
99. See generally The World Bank Group (visited June 27, 1998) <http://
www.worldbank.org>.
100. See The International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (visited July 30,
1998) <http://www.worldbank.orghtml/extdr/icsid.html> (explaining Internal Center for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes, under 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States).
101. See generally IMF, International Monetary Fund, IMF Home Page (visited July 30,
1998) <http://www.imf.org>.
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to promote international monetary cooperation; to facilitate the
expansion and balanced growth of international trade; to pro-
mote exchange stability; to assist in the establishment of a mul-
tilateral system of payments; to make its general resources
temporarily available to its members experiencing balance of
payments difficulties under adequate safeguards; and to shorten
the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the in-
ternational balances of payments of members.10 2
It has adopted a choice of law rules, which are widely applied by na-
tional courts. 103 The fund also exercises strong enforcement powers
by its lending decisions, 14 as demonstrated in the recent Asian finan-
cial crisis.105
11. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
The Basle Committee was established by the central bank gover-
nors in 1974 to address bank capital requirements. 1°6 It is a mecha-
nism for cooperation, without possessing any formal supranational
powers. 107
12. Universal Postal Union
The Universal Postal Union early established a norm that mail
not be inspected outside the country of origin which, while nonbind-
ing as a formal matter, has become a customary rule honored almost
everywhere. 10 8 The Berne Treaty Concerning the Formation of a
General Postal Union, enacted on October 9, 1874, guaranteed a right
of transit, and obligated signatories to forward closed mail by the
102. Factsheet-International Monetary Fund (IMF) at a Glance (visited June 27, 1998)
<http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/glance.htm>.
103. See Kirgis, supra note 93, at 155-56 (explaining that the IMF interpretation of the Fund
Agreement would have the effect of superceding inconsistent domestic choice-of-law rules if
domestic courts of the member states adhere to the IMF interpretation).
104. See generally Articles of Agreement-Article 18 (visited July 1, 1998) <http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aal8.htm> (provides text of Articles of Agreement of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, Article XVIII: Allocation and Cancellation of Special Drawing
Rights).
105. See Stanley Fischer, In Defense of the IMF: Specialized Tools for a Specialized Task, 77
FOREIGN AFF. 103 (1998) (probing role of IMF in Asian financial crisis).
106. See generally BCBS Compendium, Volume 1: Basic Supervisory Methods (visited July
30, 1998) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc002.htm>.
107. See History of the Basle Committee and its Membership (visited Feb. 11. 1999) <http://
www.bis.org/publlbcbscl0l.pdf>.
108. See Kirgis, supra note 93, at 155.
[Vol. 73:997
THE INTERNET IS CHANGING INTERNATIONAL LAW
most rapid routes within their command. 1°9
C. Regional Institutions
In some substantive areas, agreement may not be possible on a
global basis; rather, it is achievable on a regional basis. Some prob-
lems exist regionally and not globally. A number of international
treaties provide frameworks for further negotiation, for direct rule-
making, and for adjudication at the regional level.
1. European Union
The European Union 10 is nearly a federal government for
Europe although the word "federal" engenders much controversy,11'
especially by the British who oppose strengthening community insti-
tutions at the expense of sovereign powers of member states. De-
fined originally by the Treaty of Rome, it included three separate
communities: the European Economic Community, the European
Iron and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity. The European Union was consolidated and strengthened by
the Single European Act in 1986, and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.112
It is composed of a commission, exercising executive power; the
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, exercising legisla-
tive power; and the European Court of Justice,"' exercising adjudica-
tory power. The Union's rulemaking powers are extensive and pro-
found. They have been used to revolutionize competition law
109. See Treaty Relative to the Formation of a General Postal Union, Oct. 9, 1874, art. X,
147 CTS 136 (printed in French). See generally Lyall, supra note 96, at 790 (noting that ITU and
UPU are the oldest international organizations still operating).
110. See generally Welcome to Europa (visited July 30, 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/
index-en.htm>; DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
EUROPE (1998) (explaining evolution of competition law as the motivating force for the
development of the European Union).
111. See generally J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and Its
Discontents, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 354, 354-60 (1996-97) (referring to perception of consti-
tutionalism); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2466-83 (1991).
112. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (visited
Oct. 14, 1998) <http://ue.eu.int/Amsterdam/en/traiteco/en/conso2/conso2.htm> (link to Part
Five-Institutions of the Community); Consolidated Versions of the Treaties (visited Jan. 13
1999) <http://ue.eu.int/Amsterdam/en/traiteco/enl.htm> (major constitutional documents of
European Union, defining powers and authorities of major institutions); Institutions of the
European Union (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/inst-en.htm> (describing major in-
stitutions of European Union).
113. Trial level adjudication is the- responsibility of the European Court of First Instance.
See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 28, 1986, art. 168a, reprinted at
E.C. Bull. Supp. No.2 [hereinafter EC TREATY].
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throughout western Europe, liberalize telecommunications, transform
national into continent-wide labor markets, establish a monetary un-
ion, and begin the process of harmonizing private and criminal law
throughout western Europe.114 The adjudicatory powers of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice are complete. Its decisions are supreme over
those of national courts on matters of European law, and its prelimi-
nary ruling jurisdiction regularly puts it in the position of deciding
European law components of cases pending before national courts,
thus determining the decisions of national courts.115
The Union's enforcement powers are limited, although theoreti-
cally they exist. There is no European police force, and the emerging
aspiration to develop EU-based military capability within the West-
ern European Union ("WEU") was dashed on the rocks of the break
up of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, national enforcement mechanisms
are regularly and dependably used to effectuate decisions of EU insti-
tutions, and threats not to comply with European Union decisions are
the exception rather than the rule.116
2. Council of Europe
Now forty members strong, the Council of Europe"7 established
the European Convention on Human Rights'18 in the wake of World
War II. It is independent of the European Union, although its mem-
bership overlaps substantially, and its founders essentially were the
114. Compare The Amsterdam Treaty: A Comprehensive Guide (visited Sept. 8, 1998)
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/sg/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a09000.htm> (explaining plans for evo-
lution of European Union, adopted at 1997 Amsterdam intergovernmental conference), with
P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCrION TO THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1-65, 73 (Laurence W. Gormley ed., 2d ed. 1990) (genesis and gen-
eral aspects of European communities).
115. See EC TREATY, supra note 113, art. 169 (jurisdiction over state compliance with
European law); id. art. 177 (jurisdiction over questions of European law referred by national
courts); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413-17 (1991) (ex-
plaining importance of doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, implied powers, and human rights,
adopted by European Court of Justice). But see J.H.H. Weiler, Bread And Circus: The State Of
European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 223, 227 (1998) (noting tendency of national courts to
defy European Court of Justice); Weiler & Trachtman, supra note 111, at 354, 367 (discussing
supremacy of European Court of Justice and growing resistance by national courts).
116. But see Alexander MacLeod, British Battle Cry: Workaholics Unite!, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Nov. 13, 1996, at 6 (reporting British refusal to accede to European Commission di-
rective to shorten work week).
117. See generally Welcome to the Council of Europe (visited June 27, 1998) <http://
www.coe.fr/index.esp>.
118. See [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter Pro-
tection of Human Rights].
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same as the founders of the three communities that have converged
into the European Union. Its principal institutions are the European
Court of Human Rights1 9 ("ECHR"); the European Commission of
Human Rights, 120 soon to be merged into a redefined court; and a
Committee of Ministers. 121  Current members include most of the
former communist countries in central and eastern Europe. 122
The Council institutions1 23 exercise significant lawmaking and
adjudicatory-but not enforcement-powers. The convention itself
defines basic norms of human rights, 24 and thus represents the exer-
cise of significant rulemaking power by its signatories. 12 The Com-
mittee of Ministers has subordinate power to adopt declarations that
represent new rules, which are advisory in nature.126
The Council of Europe acquired an increased role in European
affairs after the Vienna summit in October 1993,
where the member states recognized how important it was for secu-
rity and stability in Europe that all its countries should accept the
principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Under
that general concern for democratic security, the Council of Europe
has laid down a series of common principles governing the protec-
tion of national minorities, actively supported the democratic tran-
sition process and strengthened its machinery for monitoring its
members' respect for their undertakings. 127
119. See id. art. 19, para. 2.
120. See id. art. 19, para. 1.
121. Protocol 11 merges the two institutions.
122. In early 1997, there were forty members of the Council of Europe: Albania, Andorra,
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, The Rus-
sian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former
"Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.
123. Council institutions include the Council of Ministers, a decision-making body; the Par-
liamentary Assembly, a deliberative body; and the Committee of the Regions, Congress of Lo-
cal and Regional Authorities of Europe, a voice for local democracy. See Welcome to Europa
(visited Sept. 22, 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/index-en.htm>.
124. See Protection of Human Rights, supra note 118, arts. 1-18.
125. The Council of Europe, its Secretary General, and its Committee of Ministers exist in-
dependently of the European Convention. The Convention was adopted by the Council and is
integrated with it.
126. Under Article 15b of the Statute of the Council of Europe, the Council of Ministers
adopts non-binding recommendations for member governments. The Committee of Ministers
also "decides what follow-up should be given to proposals of the Parliamentary Assembly, the
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities and the specialist ministerial conferences that the
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The Council's Venice Commission' 28 specifically focuses on en-
hancing the functioning of new constitutional courts, through pub-
lishing their opinions and otherwise.129 Already, the Venice Commis-
sion has collected and published the full text of significant
constitutional court opinions in paper formats and implemented a
plan to move these opinions to CD-ROM and Web media in 1997.
The Council has developed a conceptual topology or thesaurus to in-
dex opinions according to their subject matter. Implementation of
that system presently requires significant human editorial effort. The
author of this article has worked with the Commission and with
member constitutional courts to use the Internet to improve the effi-
ciency of its decision publishing operation. 130
3. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
("OSCE")'3 was established by the Helsinki agreement of 1975, as
amended by the Charter of Paris of 1990. Its members include all the
Council of Europe's member states, the United States, Canada, and
the Asian republics which were formerly part of the old Soviet Union.
Originally intended to be an advisory and conciliation organization
with respect to disputes among states,1 32 the OSCE increasingly has
been drawn into operational intrastate roles, making rules for the
Bosnian elections, assisting in the establishment and early functioning
of the Bosnian ombudsman, and developing recommendations on the
Serbian municipal elections.133
Its effectiveness has been high, and its potential is strong in the
rulemaking and soft adjudication (mediation and conciliation) areas
for both Rule of Law and interstate dispute resolution. There is no
reason, however, to suppose that it will acquire its own enforcement
128. The European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice Commission) is
an advisory body on constitutional law, set up within the Council of Europe. See The Work of
the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (visited Oct. 13, 1998) <http://
www.coe.fr/venice/venice.htm>.
129. The Venice Commission is the popular name of the European Commission for Democ-
racy Through Law, an activity of the Council of Europe. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace
and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 155, 184 (1997) (discussing Venice Commission
and Web-based activities).
130. See, e.g., (visited Sept. 8, 1998) <http://www.eceul.net>.
131. See generally OSCE Homepage (visited Sept. 8,1998) <http://www.osce.org>.
132. For background and description, see generally OSCE- Vade Mecum 5/96 (visited June
27, 1998) <http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/oscevae.htm>.
133. See Serbia: Opposition Continues Protest (visited Feb. 11, 1999) <http://www.rferl.org/
nca/news/1996/12/N.RU.961218174455.html>.
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resources. Still, one of the usual proposals for reform of the OSCE is
to give it a larger staff of its own rather than obligating it to rely on
volunteers from its members.'3 The OSCE did supervise the Bosnian
elections, and this arguably is an example of the enforcement func-
tion, inasmuch as several hundred election observers were deployed
to individual polling places in Bosnia. Even though their powers
were limited to oversight and reporting, their presence no doubt en-
hanced compliance with the election rules. In charting its evolution,
the OSCE has noted the desirability of close cooperation with NATO
and the WEU. 135
4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") was organ-
ized in the earliest days of the Cold War as a military alliance to off-
set Russian imperial ambitions in western Europe.1 6 Governed by
the North Atlantic Council, it has became a kind of enforcement arm
for the United Nations Security Council in Bosnia, succeeding
through the Implementation Force for Bosnia and the Stabilization
Force in enforcing the Dayton Accords, 137 while the UN had failed
through the UN Protection Force ("UNPROFOR") to enforce ear-
lier cease-fires. In Bosnia, its role is purely one of enforcement,
which complements all of the other international institutions that are
marked by their lack of enforcement capacity. NATO has obvious
capacity to become a regular enforcement tool for the UN and other
international institutions, although such a change necessitates shifting
its mission from predominantly a collective defense body into a col-
lective security body,138 and it would be awkward to project its force
outside the European continent. 39 Basic alternatives for NATO's fu-
134. See Chairman's Summary (visited Sept. 8, 1998) <http://www.osce.org/news/
mc06ejO2.htm> (discussing proposals for improving OSCE effectiveness).
135. See OSCE- Vade Mecum 5/96, supra note 132.
136. See generally NATO Official Homepage (visited June 27, 1998) <http://www.nato.int>.
137. See Javier Solana, NA TO's Role in Bosnia: Charting a New Course for the Alliance, 44
NATO REV. 3 (1996). Web edition available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/> (ex-
plaining how Combined Joint Task Forces initiative provided framework for Bosnia force, and
proposing it as a model for future non-Article 5 operations outside the geographic area reserved
for Article 5 operations).
138. But see The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (visited Sept. 8, 1998) <http://
www.nato.int/docu/comm/c9lllO7a.htm> at Part III [hereinafter 1991 Strategy Statement] (ac-
knowledging basis under Article 4 for joint military operations outside the limits of Articles 5
and 6).
139. These and other reasons make NATO an unlikely general-purpose enforcement arm
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ture were addressed at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Madrid, in 1997, resulting in new force structures. 14°
Regardless of limits on a more general enforcement role for
NATO, it is becoming clearer that NATO is a crucial part of a new
political structure "with muscle" to preserve peace and establish civil
societies throughout Europe. NATO already has endorsed and em-
braced the OSCE as a close partner in a new structure for peace in
Europe.141 NATO's military capacity 42 and the flexibility of its
authority under Article 4 to engage in peacekeeping and human
rights activities 143 makes it a more interesting possible anchor for an
intraregional security framework than other entities that lack coer-
cive capability.
Thus, NATO is emerging as the obvious foundation for an in-
traregional security framework, but to understand NATO's potential
requires clear thinking about the fundamental difference between
two possible NATO roles. The first role-collective defense-domi-
nated NATO's Cold War role. This role is expressed in Article 5 of
the North Atlantic Charter which states: "The Parties agree that an
armed attack against one or more of them.., shall be considered an
attack against them all.... "144 Everyone understands that Russia and
its allies in Eastern Europe served as focal points for this defensive
for the UN. Within Europe, however, there are growing calls for NATO to change its mission
from one of defending the West from attack from the East into one of providing a political
structure for Europe. See Stanley R. Sloan, Negotiating a New Transatlantic Bargain, 44 NATO
REV. 19, 21-22 (1996), reprinted in <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9602-5.htm> (urg-
ing that future mission and structure of NATO be settled before enlarging it; noting that non-
article 5 military missions probably are not limited by the geographic constraints of Article 6);
see also Vaclav Havel, A Call to Sacrifice, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 6 (Mar-Apr. 1994) (discussing pos-
sible expansion of NATO into a "Euro-Asian nuclear power").
140. See Sloan, supra note 139, at 20; see also 1991 Strategy Statement, supra note 138.
141. Professor Art notes that the evolution of NATO into a post-Cold War entity began
with the London summit in July 1990, where one of four initiatives agreed to was the institu-
tionalization of the then Council for Security in Europe ("CSCE") to provide a forum for a
wider political dialogue in a more unified Europe "to strengthen the continent's only pan-
European forum so that the Soviet Union would not feel excluded from Europe." Robert J.
Art, Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO, 111 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 13 (1996) re-
printed in <http://epn.org/psq/robtart.html>. Robert J. Art is director of the International
Studies Program at Brandeis University.
142. NATO's military value derives from its integrated military planning and command
structure rather than from the discretionary assignment of national forces to it. National forces
can be assigned anywhere, but they cannot be used effectively absent an organizational infra-
structure such as NATO has nurtured for fifty years.
143. The development of Combined Joint Task Forces, see Art, supra note 141, at 31, and
the rationalization of a Eurocorps command structure which allows European initiatives with
limited American involvement, see id. at 29, enhance this flexibility.
144. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246,
available at <http://www.nato.int/doculbasictxt/treaty.htm>.
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alliance. But NATO's second role-collective security-is most im-
portant in the post-Cold War world. 145 Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the
original NATO treaty provide ample authority for a new NATO built
on the collective security model) 46
5. NAFTA
In addition to limiting restrictions on imports and exports, the
North American Free Trade Agreement facilitates investment flows
by imposing most-favored nation status and national-treatment obli-
gations with respect to investors, restricting expropriation, and pro-
viding for arbitration of investment disputes.1 47
6. Common Market of the South: Mercosur
Mercado Comun del Sur arose from a treaty signed March 26,
1991, establishing a common market among the signatories as of
1994.148 Participants currently include Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Chile.149 Economic integration under the treaty is gov-
erned by a council comprising ministers for economic affairs and cen-
tral bankers of the signatories, and by an administrative arm com-
posed of their representatives.150
7. APEC
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum 51 has eighteen
145. Nearly fifty years ago, another shift occurred from a collective defense orientation to a
collective security orientation, when the Western Union Defense Organization ("WUDO"),
focused on defending against a German threat that later faded, and became the WEU as Ger-
many was incorporated into NATO in 1954. See Art, supra note 141, at 21. In this context,
NATO played a collective security role, a role that included Germany, while WUDO had
played a collective defense role, a role that excluded Germany.
146. See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 144, arts. 1-4, 34 U.N.T.S. at 244-46. The litera-
ture on NATO is consistent with the idea. See John R. Galvin, From Immediate Defense To-
wards Long-term Stability (visited July 3, 1998) <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/
9106-3.htm> and other articles in the NATO Review.
147. See Camponovo, supra note 78, at 195 (reviewing NAFTA's role in protecting foreign
direct investment).
148. See Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., 30
I.L.M. 1041.
149. See Sergio Lopez Ayllon, The Impact of International Trade Agreements in the Legal
Systems of the American Continent, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 761, 765 (1997).
150. See also Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of Legal Ob-
stacles Under a NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 127, 143 (1995) (claiming Mercosur
is one of the most successful subregional arrangements); James Stamps, Free Trade Area for the
Americas, 5 No. 10 MEX. TRADE & L. REP. 7, 9 (1995) (discussing the importance of Chile to
Mercosur).
151. See generally APEC Homepage (visited July 3, 1998) <http://www.apecsec.org.sg/>.
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members. 152 It was established at the end of the Cold War on the ini-
tiative of Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke and United States
President George Bush. Professor Peter Drysdale identified three
preconditions for successful Asia-Pacific cooperation:
(1) a rules-based international economic system;
(2) continuing reform of the region's economies and polities;
and
(3) continued American engagement.'53
At a conference in Seattle in 1993, heads of government identi-
fied the potential for APEC in the 21st century.154 APEC has the po-
tential to become a forum for considering development priorities in
Asia, for working with the Asian Development Bank to assure that
all can share in the region's economic growth, and for focusing atten-
tion on barriers to trade and growth. It also could evolve into a fo-
rum for dispute resolution on economic matters. It could help to set
up common telecommunication standards, and help Asia move to-
ward an open skies agreement that could lower fares for airline pas-
sengers and cargo and provide greater consumer choices over routes.
It could also promote solutions to environmental problems.
The 1995 Osaka meeting was a major step forward, and this pro-
gress was reinforced by action plans developed in the 1996 Manila
conference.'55 Together, the Osaka and Manila conferences resolved
two major issues: (1) the question of comprehensiveness, resolved by
an agreement to include all sectors in the goal of liberalization; and
(2) the question of non-discrimination, essentially resolved by an as-
piration toward equal treatment of China, still being worked out
mostly in the context of American policy. 15 6 The Manila Conference
152. See APEC-Member Economies (visited July 12, 1998) <http://apecsec.org.sg/member/
apecmemb.html> (members include: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Indonesia, Japan,
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, The Philippines, Singapore,
South Korea, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, and The United States).
153. See Peter Drysdale, The APEC Initiative: Maintaining the Momentum in Manila, 2
ASIA-PACIFIC MAG. 44 (May 1996). Peter Drysdale is Professor in the Economics Division,
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University and Execu-
tive Director of the Australia-Japan Research Centre (AJRC).
154. See APEC Leaders' Economic Vision Statement (visited Sept. 8, 1998) <http://
www.apecsec.org.sg/econlead/blake.html> (1993 statement of APEC leaders).
155. See APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration: From Vision to Action (visited Sept. 22,
1998) <http://www.apecsec.org.sg/econlead/osaka.html> (1995 statement of APEC leaders);
APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve (visited Sept. 8, 1998) <http://
www.apecsec.org.sg/econlead/subic.html> (1996 statement of APEC leaders).
156. See APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve 5 (visited Sept. 8,
1998) <http://www.apecsec.org.sg/econlead/osaka.html> (commitment to comprehensiveness
and non-discrimination).
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in 1996157 developed collective and individual action plans, and the
Vancouver Conference in 1997, among other things, expressed a
commitment to electronic commerce. 158
D. Conclusions
There are many engines of international law. While there is no
universally accepted international legislature, there are many interna-
tional legislatures with overlapping memberships. The list of interna-
tional organizations just presented is not exhaustive; yet one can
hardly review even this partial list without concluding that there is a
wide variety of rulemaking, adjudication, and enforcement arenas in
the international context. The strengthening of all of these types of
international institutions increases the production of international law
and its practical applicability, continuing the shift away from a body
of international laws comprising abstract norms and aspirations into
the same kind of complete legal system that most people expect to
exist at the state level. Anything that increases the effective func-
tioning of these institutions increases the influence of international
law.
III. NEW INTERNATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS CALLED NGOs
SHAPE NORM DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL OPERATION
AND THE INTERNET HELPS
Many private institutions enjoy power in international politics
and law that rivals that exerted by traditional states.15 9 Mohammed
Bedjaoui refers to Francois Rigaux's "Transnational Civil Society" as
involving three determining agents: the state acting through its do-
mestic law, the community of states in the international order, and
individuals acting through private initiatives including Non-
Governmental Organizations ("NGOs").16° "It is through the non-
governmental organizations and, more and more often, through the
157. See generally Manila Action Plan for APEC (visited July 3, 1998) <http://
www.apecsec.org.sg/mapa/voll/volumel.html>.
158. See APEC Leaders' Declaration: Connecting the APEC Community 15 (visited Sept.
8, 1998) <http://www.apecsec.org.sg/econlead/vancouver.html>.
159. See Jessica T. Matthews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF., 50, 58 (Jan.-Feb. 1997) (con-
trolling international crime, states must compromise cherished sovereign roles, including coop-
eration with the private sector); id. at 59 (NGOs create new constituencies for compliance with
international law).
160. See INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 24, at 12.
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mass media that world public opinion makes its voice heard on the
major problems requiring action at the international level. ' 161 Just as
domestic interest groups are an essential part of the political dynam-
ics of domestic politics, NGOs are an essential part of international
rulemaking and enforcement. 162 Indeed, because the institutional
structure for international governmental functions is less complete
than that for state governmental functions, NGOs play a proportion-
ately greater role in the international context than in the domestic
context. 16
3
The NGO phenomenon is at the center of the international insti-
tutional shake out. NGOs, organized and expressing themselves
through the Internet, already have great influence on the treaty nego-
tiation process. 64 NGOs are not a new phenomenon. They were in-
strumental in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in stopping the
slave trade, promoting peace through international arbitration, advo-
cating worker solidarity, encouraging free trade, and harmonizing in-
ternational law for maritime commerce. 165
One commentator has suggested that the influence of NGOs
varies as a function of political supply and demand. 166 When particu-
lar government agencies and officials need NGOs to perform func-
tions they otherwise would perform themselves, NGO influence
grows. This is the demand side of the equation. When NGO capa-
bility increases, NGO influence also increases. This is the supply side
of the equation.167 Growing NGO influence in human rights and en-
vironmental issues has been mainly due to increasing demand, rein-
forced by some increase in NGO capability. The Internet, as ex-
plained in section B of this Part, promises to accelerate NGO
influence mainly by significantly increasing NGO capability.
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman identified seven functions
performed by NGOs: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invoca-
tion, application, termination, and appraisal. 168 Intelligence is gath-
161. Id.
162. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Govern-
ance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 185 (1997).
163. See generally id. at 189-90.
164. See id. at 272 (citing examples of NGO influence in treaty negotiations).
165. See id. at 191-95 (citing all examples enumerated in text).
166. See id. at 269.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 271 (referring to Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of
Authoritative Decision, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, 191, 221-22 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman
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ering, analyzing, and disseminating information. 6 9 Promotion is ad-
vocacy of particular policy options. 70 Prescription is actual participa-
tion in rulemaking. 17' Invocation is an accusatory role when norm
violations are detected.172 Application is actual adjudication.173 Ter-
mination extinguishes norms.174 Appraisal is the evaluation of the
performance of formal international institutions and norms. 75 Am-
nesty International and the Lawyers' Committee on Civil Rights per-
form important intelligence and invocation functions. Their role in
promotion and prescription functions was enhanced as they devel-
oped "sophisticated information networks linking dissidents, sympa-
thetic governments, and the media.' ' 76
NGO activity has been especially influential in the environ-
mental arena. At the Stockholm Conference in the early 1970s,
NGOs outnumbered accredited governmental representatives and by
1987 were allowed to address plenary sessions drafting environmental
treaties.7 7 Their role thus moved from promotion to prescription.
Greenpeace typifies aggressive performance of the invocation func-
tion. 78
A. A Synthesis from Regime Theory
Regime theory, and the processes of cultural diffusion and inter-
penetration, provide the intellectual framework to understand the in-
teraction of state actors and NGOs in the institutional framework
summarized in Part II. NGOs, of course, influence the evolution of
law not only at the international level, acting through the interna-
tional institutions, but also at the state level by participating in do-
mestic politics and domestic law-forming and law-applying institu-
tions. Anything that strengthens these processes, including
information technology, intensifies the influence of these new actors.
eds., 1981)).
169. See McDougal et al., supra note 168, at 221.
170. See Charnovitz, supra note 162, at 271 & n.797 (citing McDougal et al., supra note 168,
at 221-22 (defining private associations as groups not seeking power)).
171. See id. at 272.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 273.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 264.
177. See id. at 262-64.
178. See id. at 264.
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Michael Mandelbaum has observed that the first two great wars
of the 20th century (the Cold War was the third) were followed by
movements for "Liberal Internationalism" a.k.a. "Wilsonianism," led
predominantly by the United States.179  Although Liberal Interna-
tionalism often is attacked as naive by prominent internationalists
such as George Kennan and Henry Kissinger, in fact it has pre-
vailed. 180 Its elements of democracy and self determination, free
trade, and arms control have become the dominant commitments of
the new era after the Cold War.
A fourth element, international organization, also has prevailed
(although Mandelbaum says it has not), but in a different way than
Wilson envisioned. Rather than being realized through a comprehen-
sive world government concerned mainly with security issues, the
fourth element has prevailed in the form of regional organizations
like NATO and NAFTA, as well as specialized global intergovern-
mental organizations such as: the IMF and the WTO, concerned
mostly with trade; and global NGOs concerned especially with human
rights and environmental protection.' 81 The rise and influence of
these international organizations is attributable to the movement of
the international community toward rule-based behavior through the
rule of law strand of democracy, its movement to rationalize free
trade, and its movement to give effect to arms control.182
To be sure, Wilson was wrong that the establishment of interna-
tional organizations was a prerequisite to realization of the substan-
tive goals of democracy, free trade, and arms control. Rather, a sub-
stantive political commitment to these goals preceded the
179. Professor Mandelbaum's views discussed in the text were expressed in a private discus-
sion sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, in November, 1997, which the
author attended.
180. See GEORGE F. KENNAN, AT A CENTURY'S ENDING: REFLECTIONS 271 (1996)
(sharply criticizing human rights accords and other "moralistic" approaches to international re-
lations); HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 30 (1994) (Wilsonian approach has prevailed); id. at
52-54 (questioning Wilsonian premises); id. at 804-11 (stating that Wilsonianism seemed trium-
phant at the end of the Century, but its core concepts are insufficient for international stability);
JOHN G. RUGGIE, WINNING THE PEACE: AMERICA AND WORLD ORDER IN THE NEW ERA 2
(1996) (explaining that Bush and Clinton concepts of "new world order" were broadly Wilso-
nian).
181. See Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffman, Conclusion: Structure, Strategy and Insti-
tutional Roles, in AFTER THE COLD WAR 381-404 (Robert 0. Keohane et al. eds., 1993) (re-
viewing interaction of political and economic forces in emergence and strengthening of interna-
tional organizations and regimes after World War II).
182. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 135-216 (1984) (exploring interaction of economic and political
forces in emergence of U.S. hegemony and more powerful international organizations in post-
World War II period).
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establishment of international organization. 8" Nevertheless, interna-
tional organization was essential to achieve the democratic, free
trade, and arms control goals. It does not matter that rule-based re-
gimes are in some sense voluntary. All law is voluntary. No legal sys-
tem has sufficient resources in the long run to coerce compliance with
rules and procedural outcomes not supported as legitimate by a sig-
nificant portion of the governed population, or, at a bare minimum,
by the instruments of enforcement-the army and police. So rather
than dismissing post-World War II international organizations as vol-
untary, and therefore illusory, it is more helpful to focus on their util-
ity in reducing transaction costs for rulemaking and rule application
and for satisfying more general psychological desires not to be left
out, as in the case of the Euro and China's accession to the WTO. In
both instances, states are willing to make considerable sacrifices in
sovereignty and policy in order to join the club even though the bene-
fits of club membership may be speculative and indistinct.
One of the problems with Realist and Neo-Realist evaluation of
international organizations, which international relationship scholars
usually call "regimes,"' 184 is that they suggest that legal institutions are
interesting only when they represent a way of imposing norms against
the will of those made subject to the norms. Because this rarely hap-
pens in a dramatic way, Realists and Neo-Realists conclude that in-
ternational regimes are of only peripheral importance in international
relations. This is a misperception of the way law works. To be sure,
the conventional definition of a legal system emphasizes coercive en-
forcement as a possibility. 85  But coercion is relatively rarely em-
183. See Harold Hongju Koh, Remark, A World Transformed, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. ix, x-xii
(1995) (exploring forces that have led to creation of regimes and international organizations);
Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Di-
lemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014, 1037 (1996-97) (providing dis-
courses over free trade and open markets, the rule of law and human rights, biodiversity and the
ecosphere led to establishment of international networks); Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the
Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429, 434 (1997) (exploring forces that led to
emergence of international organizations).
184. Regimes are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actor expectations converge." Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for
International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141 (Stephan D. Krasner ed., 1983). Re-
gime theory can be associated with both the liberal and the realistic schools of thought in inter-
national relations. See id. at viii (stating that liberals consider regimes to be the natural state of
affairs; realists now concede that regimes, once established, can take on "a life of their own").
185. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 185-86 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing
the role of coercion in legal systems and criticizing Kelsen's formulation of coercion's role as
over-simple). Hans Kelsen noted: "[T]o give the tribunal any substantial measure of jurisdiction
over disputes between individuals and states ... is the first effective step to the super-State."
HANS KELSEN, THE LEGAL PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 27 (1935); see also JOSEPH
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ployed in healthy legal systems. Some combination of simple accep-
tance of norms and legal decision making and of a belief that coercion
would be used in the face of noncompliance suffices to make compli-
ance more or less voluntary in the vast majority of cases. 186
The analytical problem, of course, is to separate genuinely volun-
tary compliance from compliance induced by the ultimate possibility
of coercion. One way to cleave the two interrelated modes of com-
pliance is to focus on those instances in which coercion is extremely
unlikely or legally impossible. Compliance with technical standards
set by computer network administrators or compliance with social
norms such as waiting in line are possibilities. Even when one can
identify cases in which coercion plays no, or only a very small, role,
one still must decide whether the existence of "legal" institutions,
wherein bare norms, or a combination of norms and application
mechanisms, makes a difference. If compliance is really voluntary,
why bother with the institutions? This is the suggestion of the realists
with respect to international legal institutions.
Here, the regime theorists have suggested some fruitful an-
swers:187 institutionalization may crystallize the norms, thus making
compliance more likely because it is easier to understand what the
norms are. Institutionalization may reduce transaction costs for de-
veloping norms. 18 Institutionalization may reduce ambiguity as to
what conduct constitutes compliance and what constitutes violation,
making voluntarism a clearer path. Institutionalization makes it eas-
ier to focus social, but not coercive, disapproval of violators by re-
ducing the transaction cost for rule compliers who wish to express
RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 233 (1979); Joseph Raz,
Authority and Consent, 67 VA. L. REv. 103 (1981).
186. My colleague, Dale Nance, recently distinguished between guidance and enforcement
rules. See generally Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of
the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REv. 837, 908-18 (1997). His distinction helps illustrate how rules may
be effective without necessary resort to coercive power-even though coercion sits in the back-
ground for most legal rules.
187. One prominent Realist student of regimes, Robert 0. Keohane, has explained that re-
gimes should be understood as analogous to contracts rather than as quasi-governments. See
Keohane, supra note 184, at 146. He further explains that the demand for regimes can be un-
derstood by theories of "market failure" in economics, which emphasize transaction costs and
uncertainty. There will be a demand for regimes in international relations because they reduce
transaction costs and reduce uncertainty by enhancing the availability of information. See id. at
150-51.
188. See id. at 155-57 (explaining demand for regimes in terms of Coase Theorem). Keo-
hane suggests that regimes reduce transaction costs when "issue density"-the number and im-
portance of issues in a given policy space-is high. See id. at 155. Among other things, high is-
sue density means that linkages and side payments are more numerous, and regimes facilitate
both.
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their disapproval of rule violations. In other instances, regimes per-
form an insurance function. 189 In most of these areas, regimes succeed
in proportion to their success in "providing high quality information
to policy makers." 190
These regime functions belie the conventional wisdom that in-
ternational law is not really law because so many of the traditional at-
tributes of law are missing. In fact, many regimes provide relatively
strong rulemaking, adjudication, and enforcement functions. Their
responsiveness and adaptability may be subject to criticism, but so
also is the responsiveness and the adaptability of administrative agen-
cies within national legal systems.
As section B of this Part explains, the Internet improves the ef-
fectiveness of international regimes by making it easier to negotiate
treaties and treaty modifications, by increasing the range of proce-
dural options for adjudication, and by improving the flow of enforce-
ment information generated by NGOs and others. Regimes interna-
tionalize law because they channel international factors to influence
domestic political results, at least in democratic political systems. In
other words, regimes cause states to internalize international law.
They increase cultural diffusion because they increase the number of
channels through which cultural influences from all other cultures can
impinge. Generally, they heighten interpenetration of legal norms
among legal systems.
1. Cultural Diffusion
Both Mandelbaum and MacNeil have observed that "cultural
diffusion" was one of the reasons for the end of the Cold War and the
victory of the West.'9 ' The West won the Cold War not by military
success but by ideas. The people of Eastern European and Russia
changed their minds. They decided they preferred market capitalism
over central planning and democracy over the dictatorship of the
proletariat. Cultural diffusion induced them to change their minds,
not merely by exposing them to ideological arguments, but by expos-
ing them to the results of competing systems. The war was won as
much by desire for blue jeans and rock music compact discs as it was
by a comparison of Karl Marx and Adam Smith.
189. See id. at 167.
190. Id. at 165.
191. This analysis of Wilson's vision was expressed by Michael Mandelbaum at breakfast
remarks where the author was present in March, 1998.
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Information technology enables cultural diffusion. The rise of
the Internet makes it easier for an elite-and, increasingly, the
masses-to obtain information on demand about almost anything
through mechanisms that are hard for totalitarian governments to de-
tect or to jam. This new means of access broadens the information
possibilities far beyond what was available through radio broadcasts
by the Voice of America and similar channels-vehicles relatively
easily jammed.
2. Interpenetration
In a masterful recapitulation of the competing and overlapping
strands of international law, Harold Koh argues that recent versions
of old theories come close to the key to understanding why nations
obey international law: the recent versions illuminate the process of
"norm internalization."' 12 Transnational actors such as public offi-
cials, "norm entrepreneurs," and NGOs mobilize domestic elites and
popular constituencies and set in motion a domestic political process
that internationalizes a norm of international law.193 The process can
be viewed at three overlapping and potentially reinforcing levels: the
level of the international system itself; the level of individuals and
groups who make up the state; and the processes and institutions of
domestic politics. 194
International institutions make a difference in compliance be-
cause they clarify norms, provide a mechanism for detecting noncom-
pliance, and commit the parties to interact repeatedly over a sus-
tained period of time. 195  Gradually the international norms
interpenetrate the domestic legal system of the participants, ripening
into "symbolic structures, standard operating procedures, and other
internal mechanisms to maintain habitual compliance with the inter-
nalized norms."'196 Democratization strengthens the effect of interna-
tional law because international law as rhetoric influences masses
more than it influences leadership cadres, who are more likely to set
policy based on interests in the realist tradition.
192. See Hongju Koh, supra note 19, at 2645.
193. See id. at 2648 (analyzing example of ABM Treaty Interpretation debate).
194. See id. at 2649-50.
195. See id. at 2653 (analyzing example of domestic pressures to comply with Oslo Accords
by Netanyahu government).
196. Id. at 2654.
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B. How Does the Internet Affect These Phenomena?
The Internet is not simply a technology that improves the effi-
ciencies of international institutions through automation; it has trans-
formative potential. The Internet's World Wide Web makes it easier
to access international norms, thereby promoting compliance. It fa-
cilitates harmonization of substantive law among states by improving
access to models. It improves the operation of norm-forming institu-
tions. It improves the operations of enforcement and application in-
stitutions. It potentially improves the operations and, therefore, the
strength of NGOs as a part of the political dynamics of international
rule making and enforcement.
Professor Goldsmith's comment that the transformative poten-
tial of the Internet is "much more complex than [I] suggest[],"'19 is no
doubt true, but it is also true that judging is much more complex than
the Law and Economics literature, which he cites, suggests. For ex-
ample, he suggests a model that views judges as leisure seekers. That
surely oversimplifies most judicial behavior. He suggests that many
judges are immune from political pressure. That may be true in part,
but judges are not immune from social and political approval in a
general sense. Otherwise, why do life-tenured judges care about their
reversal and affirmance rates? Judicial desire for approval of their
decisions drives them to link their own decisions with those of others.
It may be pertinent to resurrect Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes'
observation that the life of the law has not been logic; it has been ex-
perience. We do not have adequate theoretical models to explain in a
rigorous way transformations in international law and the behavior of
actors in the international arena. The absence of those models should
not blind us, however, to phenomena that are reshaping the interna-
tional stage, reinforced by information technology.
1. The Internet makes it easier to access norms, thereby improving
voluntary compliance.
Not only does greater availability and accessibility of interna-
tional law promote voluntary compliance, it increases interpenetra-
tion. While ignorance of the law may be no excuse for violating it,
one cannot obey the law unless one knows what it is. By some esti-
mates, there are more than 15,000 treaties and agreements to which
197. Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1128.
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the United States is a party.198 There are surely thousands of schol-
arly opinions about the content of customary international law.
These are scattered all over the world. The comprehensive scope of
legal publishers in the United States with respect to domestic U.S. le-
gal materials is not typical of other countries nor of international ma-
terials. Even an institution such as The Library of International Rela-
tions ("LIR") at Chicago-Kent College of Law whose mission it is to
organize international materials must devote considerable efforts to
locate them, get copies, and index them for feasible access. The
Internet is already beginning to change this process.
The Internet affects all three sources of law by making them
more available. The greatest impact is on treaty law. Access to the
Internet and the Internet's global popularity have significantly in-
creased general accessibility to treaty law on the World Wide Web.
For instance, international human rights treaties are available
through the Council of Europe.199 The United Nations is doing a
good job of making scanned images of pages of all treaties in the
United Nations series available on the Web.200
Now, the United Nations has moved rapidly to place all the trea-
ties for which it is a custodian on the Web, LIR is moving its collec-
tion (much of which already has been scanned into image form) on to
the Web, and the Venice Commission is moving its collection of con-
stitutional courts decisions to the Web. One can hope that legislative
bodies around the world will follow the lead of the U.S. Congress,
which established a multiplicity of Web servers that provide not only
the text of enacted laws but also proposed legislation and legislative
history materials.20' Hopefully, the U.S. Department of State will un-
dertake to publish on the Web treaties to which the United States is a
party. Already, this occurs on a fragmentary basis with trade agree-
ments.202
198. By 1979, the United States was estimated to have become party to 8,909 agreements,
including 1,281 treaties. Between 1980 and 1992, the United States became party to another
4,728 agreements, including 218 treaties, for a total of 13,637 agreements and 1,499 treaties. See
BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 203-04 (2d ed. 1995).
199. See generally European Court of Human Rights Home Page (visited July 3, 1998)
<http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/>.
200. See generally Index of Depts/Treaty/Collection/series (visited July 3, 1998) <http://
www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/collection/series>.
201. See Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet (visited Sept. 5, 1998)
<http://thomas.loc.gov>.
202 See Agreements Negotiated by the United States Trade Representative (visited Sept. 23,
1998) <http://www.ustr.gov/agreements/index.html> (WTO and NAFTA agreements).
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Publishing these materials on a web server -as simple as copying
a word processing file to a different directory on a small computer
connected to the Internet-makes them instantly available to the en-
tire world. Not only can a business seeking information on estab-
lishing an international satellite circuit find out about the regulatory
structure and the requirements of Inmarsat,203 but a lawyer advising a
client on immigration possibility or international bills of lading can
find relevant legal materials as easily as he can locate a court of ap-
peals case on Westlaw.
While deliberate noncompliance with law is always a possibility,
most people conduct their affairs so as to comply with legal norms
they know about. Making it easier for them to know the norms either
directly or through their counsel increases the likelihood of compli-
ance. The Internet can make international norms more prominent in
the rhetoric that underpins any collective security (or economic) ini-
tiative.2°4 Information technology, especially the Internet, makes it
easier to refer to international norms because it makes them more ac-
cessible to those wishing to make such reference. It also makes po-
litical audiences more receptive because they know about the interna-
tional norms that are made more accessible. Norm-based rhetoric
and information technology supporting the rhetoric is more impor-
tant in the absence of the bipolar political structures defining the
Cold War because the absence of those structures makes norm-based
decisionmaking, rather than traditional interest-based patterns of de-
cisionmaking, more likely. 25
2. The Internet facilitates harmonization among state laws by
improving access to models.
The kind of large scale Web publishing of international docu-
ments described in the preceding paragraphs results in the extension
of the virtual law library already present on the Internet Web. Such
an expanded library provides a rich source of models for interest
groups and parliamentarians writing new law. No longer must the
author of a new commercial law for Bosnia-Herzegovina take a stab
203. See Inmarsat Homepage (visited Aug. 26 1998) <http://www.inmarsat.org/index2.html>.
204. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L.
455, 468-69 (1996) (explaining role of rhetoric linked to norms of international law in shaping
responses in security council and in domestic support for those responses).
205. See id. at 468 (explaining changes in diplomatic reference to "security" after the Cold
War to include non-military threats to states and people).
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in the dark; the author can begin with recently enacted commercial
laws in Croatia and emerging models from the European Commis-
sion, both available on the Internet. 2°6
The availability of legislative models increases the likelihood of
harmony among legislative enactments in different sovereign states,
reinforcing economic pressures for such harmonization in order to
reduce trade barriers. But not only does the virtual library make
harmonization of positive law more likely-it also makes harmoniza-
tion of decisional law more likely. The constitutional courts con-
nected through the Venice Commission must decide issues arising
under the European Convention on Human Rights-a single source
of positive human rights law, incorporated by reference into the con-
stitutions of most of the states of Central and Eastern Europe.2°7 Be-
cause the constitutional courts in these countries are applying the
same document, and because the kinds of conduct likely to give rise
to human rights claims do not vary substantially from state to state, it
is logical that courts from different states would decide similarly the
same issues under the same law. The Venice Commission Project
makes it easier for them to do this by giving them easy access to con-
stitutional court decisions of all of the states confronted with the same
questions.208 Even though stare decisis does not operate in a strong
form in countries without sources of similar law traditions, as a matter
of practical politics, a judge will be pressed to explain deviations from
precedent established elsewhere.2°9
Professor Goldsmith may doubt the tendency for national and in-
ternational institutions to harmonize substantive law and for judges
dealing with issues already decided by other judges to relate their
206. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parlia-
ment, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Implementa-
tion of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package (visited Sept. 5, 1998) <http://
www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/legreg/docs/97236.html>; Law on Telecommunications (visited Sept. 5,
1998) <http://www.vlada.hr/dokumenti/telecom2.htm>.
207. See The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (visited Sept. 23, 1998) <http://
www.concourt.cz/angl-ver/decisions/doc/4-276-96.html>; see generally David Seymour, The Ex-
tension of the European Convention on Human Rights to Central and Eastern Europe: Prospects
And Risks, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 243, 243-44 (1993) (discussing a common European attitude to-
wards human rights).
208. The author has assisted this phenomenon by helping constitutional courts get con-
nected to the Internet through a project called "ECEULNet." See The Constitutional Court of
the Czech Republic (visited Sept. 20, 1998) <http://www.concourt.cz/> (acknowledging assistance
from ECEULNet); The Constitutional Court of Hungary (visited Sept. 5, 1998) <http://
www.law.vill.edu/ceecillhungary/court.htm> (same).
209. See Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World's a Courtroom: Judging
in the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 273 (1997).
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own decisions to the ones that have gone before.210 If he does, his
quarrel is with phenomena evident in the real world " and not with
my arguments. In August 1998, as I was evaluating Goldsmith's cri-
tique of a draft of this article, I was agreeing to a request by a state
court chief justice to present a program to state supreme court judges
in the Midwest to show them how to access European human rights
law and tort law from other English speaking jurisdictions so they
could have a wider variety of legal models to use in analyzing domes-
tic employment discrimination and torts cases. Whether or not the
law and economics literature believes that judges follow precedent
and models from other jurisdictions, judges believe that they do.
My point is not that more information about pertinent judicial
decisions in other jurisdictions will inexorably lead to agreement
across jurisdictional lines, but rather that the easier availability of ju-
dicial decisions globally will force judges to articulate the connections
between their decisions, even if deviant, and other decisions. The re-
sult is more reasoned decisionmaking, and-I postulate, without be-
ing able to prove-a tendency for greater harmony at the margins.
There surely will be disagreement, but at least it will not be acciden-
tal.
Professor Goldsmith cites Cass Sunstein in support of the propo-
sition that decentralized national courts are not likely to interpret
standards in a uniform fashion. Professor Sunstein also says,
There is a serious problem from the standpoint of democratic citi-
zenship, since members of the polity, given the right and duty to
decide on the content of law, will by hypothesis lack knowledge of
what the law really is. This ignorance will compromise the process
of democratic assessment of law.212
The Internet increases the feasibility of obtaining knowledge of what
the law really is, by making it easier to obtain access to decisions.
Elsewhere Sunstein observes that rules are less acceptable when in-
formation costs are high.213 Reducing information costs 214 makes rules
more acceptable. More reliance on rules results in greater harmoni-
210. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1128-30.
211. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
687, 689-93 (1998) (observing that law has moved from a regime of statutory interpretation to a
regime of interpreting and applying international models, conventions, and treaties).
212. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1007 (1995).
213. See id. at 1015.
214. Professor Sunstein's reference to information pertains to factual information more than
information about rules themselves. See id. at 973. The Internet increases accessibility of fac-
tual, as well as legal, information.
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zation, at least compared to ruleless adjudication.
Ethan Katsh's argument that information technology will un-
dermine a system of precedent because it breaks down categorization,
is questionable. Just as the Web makes it easier to find more deci-
sions, it also makes it easier to organize them into categories and to
publish taxonomies that improve access to categorized cases. 215 Pro-
fessor Katsh's current views seem closer to my own than to Gold-
smith's. Katsh' 1995 book216 (Goldsmith cited his 1989 book, written
before the Internet was a relevant phenomenon)217 is bolder in ex-
ploring information technology's potential to displace existing legal
processes and institutions than was his 1989 one.218
3. The Internet improves the operation of norm-forming institutions.
The utility of the Internet's virtual library, electronic publishing,
and case-management functions is not limited to adjudication and fact
finding; it easily can be extended to aspects of international rule-
making and treaty making. Paul Szasz has dissected the treaty-
making process into four major and some twenty subordinate tasks or
"stages. 12 19 Many of these can be sped up and made more effective
by use of the Internet. In the initiation stage, assessing the likelihood
of success and developing estimates of schedule and costs can be en-
hanced by virtual libraries and by electronic surveys of member gov-
ernments. In the second stage, when the text of a multilateral treaty
is formulated, preliminary studies of the state of law can be enhanced
by virtual library functions, the completed studies and analyses can be
distributed through electronic publishing, and group drafting can use
the same deliberation tools used by judges of constitutional courts to
215. Cf. Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal
Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5 (1997) (taxonomies must evolve to accommodate globalization of
law; information transfer is necessary to enable the evolution).
216. See M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 238-41(1995).
217. See M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LAW 267 (1989).
218. Katsh notes that surprises are likely as the law responds to the information technology
revolution. See KATSH, supra note 216, at 240. Most of the questions, Katsh suggests, will fall
into two categories. See id. The first involves modifying legal doctrine to relate to new ways of
interacting. See id. The second involves the possibility that cyberspace is a "quite different
culture and one that will bring its values to bear on all of us .... A new logic has emerged." Id.
at 242 (quoting WILLIAM MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS (visited Sept. 23, 1998) <http://
mitpress.mit.edu/e-books/CityofBits/BitBiz/TerritoryTopology.html>).
219. See Szasz, supra note 47, at 70-71 (The four stages named by Szasz are (1) the introduc-
tion of a bill, (2) its assignment to a committee and the committee's report, (3) adoption by one
house of the legislature and then by the other, and finally (4) approval by the executive or re-
turn to the legislature.).
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draft opinions. When governmental consultations are necessary,
drafts can be made available through electronic publishing, and
comments can be received through the Web or e-mail, facilitating the
consultation process. In the adoption stage, deliberation software can
increase the options for consensus formation and voting. During the
ratification ("entry into force") stage, virtual library functions can
ease the burdens of smaller, less developed countries, and can organ-
ize reservations made by individual states. Once the treaty enters
into force, placing treaty depositories on the Internet-an electronic
publishing function -improves compliance. 220
All of these possibilities facilitate rule making in international in-
stitutions, where distances otherwise would be a barrier. They also
increase the role of NGOs because they represent channels for NGO
participation in addition to traditional state-controlled channels.
Professor Goldsmith also challenges my assertion that the forma-
tion of international law through treaty making and the evolution of
customary international law will be improved by the Internet. He has
been in the forefront of an attack on the "modern view" of customary
international law ("CIL"), which promotes its incorporation into U.S.
federal common law.221 Part of that attack is to point out that the
"new" CIL is developed more quickly, depends less on actual state
practice, and is fragmented by the increased number of states. The
result is growing incoherence in CIL. He says that the Internet makes
the problem worse, not better. I disagree. The problem of incoher-
ence is surely worse when many of the relevant developments and
rhetoric are invisible. The Internet reduces the transaction costs of
law formation, increases visibility of the results, and thus, at least,
makes it possible for reason to reduce incoherence.
4. The Internet facilitates the operation of application and
enforcement institutions.
The Internet makes it easier to enforce international norms
against violators. It does so by enlarging the range of possibilities for
adjudication, by enhancing NGOs' enforcement roles, and by creating
220. Szasz observes that the availability of treaties is "woefully fragmented." Id. at 107.
Dawson observed that legal publishing enhances legitimacy and development of legal norms.
Cf JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW xi-xii (1968).
221. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 2260 (stating that "CIL should not be
treated as federal law without authorization from the political branches"), with Beth Stephens,
The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 393, 395-97 (1997) (criticizing Bradley & Goldsmith's view).
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new types of sanctions.
The Internet enlarges the possibilities for adjudication involving
international norms. In private international law, international arbi-
tration already is commonplace. Parties to transnational commercial
agreements often prefer arbitration to litigation and national courts.
They have greater control over the procedure and the identity of the
decision-maker in arbitration. They can specify within very broad
limits the substantive law to be applied by the decision maker. Most
important, the international arbitration awards are more likely to be
enforceable than national court judgments because the treaty frame-
work for enforcement of international arbitration awards is much
more complete than the treaty framework for enforcement of judicial
decisions. The Internet facilitates international arbitration by making
it cheaper and quicker. The dispute process can be commenced by
electronic message. Discovery can take place by e-mail. The docket
can be posted on a private web page with links to relevant documents
in the case. Similarly, public arbitration awards can be posted and
collected on the Web so they can inform other arbitrators and others
bound by the same norms involved in the earlier arbitration about an
evolving body of decisional law.
As an example of uses of technology for this purpose, the Center
for International Law for Information Law and Policy ("CILP"), the
American Arbitration Association, the National Center for Auto-
mated Information Research ("NCAIR"), and the Cyberspace Law
Institute embarked on the Virtual Magistrate Project in October
1995.222 This project resulted in a complete system for limited-
purpose arbitration involving the claims of defamation, customary
fraud, or an intellectual property infringement against persons using
large Internet service providers. While the Virtual Magistrate system
only decided one case, its implementation was complete; indeed, it
remains available to receive additional disputes suitable for its par-
ticular rules and procedures. 223
The International Ad Hoc Committee ("IAHC") developed this
sort of recommendation in early 1997 for reorganizing the administra-
tion of Internet domain names, including preliminary adjudication of
disputes between holders of Internet Domain Names and holders of
trademarks.224 The recommended dispute resolution process envi-
222. See Virtual Magistrate (visited Sept. 5, 1998) <http://vmag.cilp.org/>.
223. See id.
224. See Internet International Ad Hoc Committee (visited Sept. 5, 1998) <http://
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sions electronic means for receiving and handling claims, a proposal
being worked out in more detail by WIPO.
The same uses of technology described for international adjudi-
cation are not limited to the international context but their advan-
tages in that context are greater than in a virtual domestic context.
International adjudication involves large distances and therefore po-
tentially greater delay and cost in every step of the adjudicatory proc-
ess. By substituting electronic communication, storage, and publica-
tion for equivalent steps requiring the transportation of persons or
physical objects, the speed of adjudication is increased and the cost is
reduced.
Other sections of this article explain the growing influence of
NGOs in international political dynamics and rule of law.225 The
Internet enhances the enforcement of international norms, but also
helps NGOs play an enforcement function. Through Web pages and
e-mail, NGOs can pull information and mobilize resources for prose-
cuting rule violations. An example of this process at work is the Or-
ganization of Economic Boycott of Myanmar for Human Rights
Violations. 226 The pressure for Pepsico and others to withdraw from
Myanmar was organized almost entirely by NGOs and private per-
sons rather than by governments. They used the Internet intensively
to organize the boycott.227 Students at Chicago-Kent College of Law
and other parts of the Illinois Institute of Technology have worked
with international organizations and NGOs to establish a Web-based
database for collecting, maintaining, and disseminating evidence on
war crimes and other human rights violations committed in Kosovo,
derived from interviews with refugees. This "Operation Kosovo"
project began in August of 1998 and continues as of this writing.
NGO rule enforcers can use specialized web pages to post results
of their investigations to solicit expressions of support and contribu-
tion for formal and informal enforcement actions. They can use the
Web and e-mail to organize mass write-in campaigns to prod political
actors and to commence formal enforcement proceedings. With or
without driving commencement of formal enforcement proceedings,
www.iahc.org/>.
225. See supra notes 159 to 196 and accompanying text.
226. See Some Example: States Who Are Violate Basic Human Rights, and Firms/Company





the Web is an extremely effective way to communicate blacklists of
rule violators, thereby facilitating informal enforcement.
Finally, in certain areas, the growing importance of the Internet
as a political and legal forum and as a marketplace creates leverage
for use against violators of international norms. One reason the de-
bate over reform of Internet domain name administration is so inter-
esting is that it has the seeds of a new private mechanism for enforc-
ing private rules in an international arena. One cannot participate
effectively on the Internet unless one has a domain name. The IAHC
recommendation envisioned a web of contractual relationships
among domain name registrars pursuant to which all registrars will
obligate themselves to revoke the domain name of an Internet user
violating the rules and decisions of institutions created under the
IAHC recommendations.
Revocation of domain names as a sanction against international
rule violators can be extended beyond the relatively narrow scope of
the IAHC dispute resolution procedure, which was limited to con-
flicts between domain names and trade marks. While obtaining
agreement on the norms to be enforced and maintaining compliance
with universal commitment to enforce decisions by revoking domain
names may be difficult in practice, conceptually, there is no reason
that domain name revocation could not become a standard penalty
for those adjudicated to be violators of international norms relating
to child pornography, hate speech, consumer fraud, intellectual prop-
erty infringement, or defamation.
5. The Internet potentially improves the operation and therefore the
strength of NGOs.
The Internet improves the operation and therefore the strength
of NGOs. As mentioned earlier, McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman
identified seven functions performed by NGOs: intelligence, promo-
tion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and ap-
praisal.228 Internet use improves performance of most of these func-
tions by NGOs, thereby facilitating the organization and operation of
NGOs, and enhancing their influence under the supply and demand
model suggested by Charnovitz. 2 9
Use of the Internet reduces the transaction costs for organizing,
228. See Charnovitz, supra note 162, at 271 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 166 to 178 and accompanying text.
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maintaining, and carrying out the functions of an NGO. Group or-
ganization and maintenance cost advantages from Internet use are
greater when group members are more dispersed. Accordingly, when
potential NGO constituents are dispersed around the world, the cost
of communicating with them and enlisting their support is likely to be
greater than the resources available unless information technology
reduces the cost.
Those active in NGOs tend to be better educated and have
higher incomes than the general population.2 30 As a consequence,
they are more likely to have access to Internet technology. When
that is the case, the cost of communicating with them is no greater
than the cost of establishing Web pages and e-mail lists and of posting
messages to those types of virtual spaces likely to appeal to them.
The Internet infrastructure is already paid for and it covers the costs
of reproduction, distribution, sorting, and storage of the materials.
This function of the Internet instantly replaces or supplements direct
mail campaigns and newsletters. As credit card commerce on the
Internet becomes more common, more people will be equipped to
contribute to NGOs directly through the Internet, thus expanding
fund raising possibilities. Marcia Dam, Vice President of USA for
UNHCR, collected substantial amounts of money for Kosovo refugee
relief through a Web page organized for that purpose.
More than this kind of membership maintenance is possible.
NGO activities can be directed and coordinated through e-mail and
the Web. A communication associated with direction and coordina-
tion can either be public or private, depending on how e-mail and
Web systems are set up. One simple approach is to set up a Web
page for each major project and allow project participants to post
messages to discussion groups placed within that Web page. As soon
as a project participant has something to report or a project leader
has a new direction to give, that information instantly is available to
other key members simply by copying a file from one directory to an-
other on an Internet-connected computer.
The Internet enhances performance of the promotion function
by NGOs. NGOs can use the Web (indeed they already are using the
230. "The majority of participants usually come from public sector backgrounds (for exam-
ple, service in elective, appointive, or administrative office) and therefore usually give large con-
sideration to the interests of the state." Bruce Russett, Ten Balances for Weighing UN Reform
Proposals, 111 POL. SCI. Q. 259, 261 (1996). "Even those whose personal backgrounds are pre-
dominantly from civil society or NGOs are usually highly privileged members of their societies."
Id.
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Web in the United States for this purpose) to mobilize mass opinion
in support of particular positions in rulemaking or enforcement pro-
ceedings. They can organize e-mail campaigns to decision-makers,
frame petitions and collect signatures, and make drafts available for
those seeking treaty language, model statutes, or model contract lan-
guage. Internet use by NGOs enhances their performance of the in-
vocation function. When violations of international norms are de-
tected by NGOs, they can focus attention on the violators through the
techniques used to organize the boycott in Myanmar and to maintain
blacklists, as discussed in section III.B.4.
As the Internet further blurs the lines between domestic interest
groups and international NGOs, it strengthens the ability of individ-
ual and small-group interests to be expressed and given fulfillment
through international institutions. Not only that, it makes it easier for
NGOs to influence domestic politics. It is no accident that China's
growing restrictions on political freedom in Hong Kong have limited
the role of international organizations in politics. International or-
ganizations, especially in the human rights area, already play an ac-
tive role in creating embarrassment for existing domestic political in-
stitutions.
The Internet and the World Wide Web fundamentally change
the possibilities for mobilizing these interest groups and focusing their
power on political choices taken by individual states. Erosion of the
United States commitment in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia re-
sulted from the impact of messages conveyed by modern information
technology to domestic U.S. political audiences. 2 1 Support in the
United States and elsewhere in the West for intervention in Bosnia
was driven largely by scenes of ethnic cleansing and civilian targeting
in Dubrovnik and Sarajevo.22 Pressure for intervention in Albania in
1997 and Kosovo in 1998-99 similarly was influenced by information
technology's capacity to connect national or local political audiences
around the world with events far away. Chicago-Kent's "Operation
Kosovo" assisted the Kosovar Albanian diaspora in Germany com-
municate with Albanian refugees in camps in Albania, through an en-
crypted e-mail channel. No longer is the choice of intervention solely
231. But see David Gompert, How to Defeat Serbia, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 30 (1994) (discussing
firm U.S. refusal to get involved in Bosnia until television coverage of Sarajevo market massa-
cre).
232. See James F. Hoge, Jr., Media Pervasiveness, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 136, 138-39 (1994) (dis-
cussing impact of CNN coverage of Sarajevo market shelling on U.S. Bosnia policy).
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the province of political elites and professionals in diplomacy; now,
due to information technology, it is a mass political question. Be-
cause the Internet increases access to the channels of communication
to these world-wide audiences, it fundamentally alters the balance of
power among different political actors.
The Internet makes it easier to organize and maintain interest
groups, both within and across state boundaries. This has large impli-
cations for collective security because it contemplates more robust in-
teraction between those seeking external intervention and those op-
posing it. The Armenian diaspora is generally perceived as largely
determining U.S. policy toward Armenia, and the Croatian diaspora
is credited with shaping German policy toward Slovenia and Croatia
after they seceded from Yugoslavia.2 3  Information technology makes
such phenomena far more likely and thus can reinforce maintenance
of and action by collective security institutions. The resources neces-
sary for collective security will be state-based for the foreseeable fu-
ture.234 Fulfilling collective security commitments requires political
will derived in turn from domestic political support in the states hav-
ing the resources. Public reaction to the siege of Sarajevo, to ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia, to the conflict in Kosovo, and to Serbian suppres-
sion of municipal election results are early examples.
C. The Net Result
1. The movement of international law away from its state-centric
tradition will be accelerated by the Internet.
The Internet will accelerate the movement of international law
away from its state-centric tradition. Professor Koh's "transnational-
ist" school of international relations theory emphasizes the role of
private actors in international law.235 Professor Anne Marie Slaughter
agrees.236 Private actors create purely private legal relationships by
dealing with each other, create mixed relationships by dealing with
233. See SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER
THE COLD WAR 184-85 (1995) (German position to recognize Slovenia and Croatia was driven
by domestic political pressures, including those of Croat minority in Germany).
234. See generally Anthony DePalma, Canada Accuses 47 of Misconduct in Bosnia, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1997, at 6 (reporting that the military mission of Canada's "65,000 strong army
... has shifted from national defense to [international] peacekeeping").
235. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-85
(1996) (explaining role of private actors in transnational legal processes).
236. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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states, and as political actors, they coordinate their private self-
interest across national boundaries, exerting pressure vertically
through national interest groups, thereby shaping the policy of states.
The Internet will strengthen all these phenomena by making the hori-
zontal relationships easier despite distance and regardless of formal
national borders.237
In other words, Rigaux's "Transnational Civil Society 238 is
strengthened by the Internet. Because of improved accessibility to
international norms, domestic judges and legislators are more likely
to be influenced by them, thus increasing interpenetration. Improved
communication and information exchange through the Internet
strengthens the role of NGOs in domestic political processes as well,
further increasing interpenetration.
2. International Human Rights Law will become indistinguishable
from private international law because the former will have effective
institutions, and the latter will have truly international norms; there is
much overlap between commercial rule of law and individual human
rights.
International human rights law and private international law will
become less distinguishable. The institutional mechanisms for en-
forcing human rights norms will improve, significantly enabled by the
Internet making it easier to detect violations, to mobilize pressure
against violators, and to adjudicate violations more cheaply. At the
same time, the overlap between commercial rule of law and human
rights law will begin to supply norms for private international law.
Basic due process concepts drawn from human rights law will accel-
erate harmonization of commercial law. By making models and draft
statutory materials more widely available more quickly, the Internet
will accelerate this process.
State control over communications and information access will
diminish, accelerating the ascendancy of new intermediaries like
NGOs at the expense of traditional sovereigns; that will tend to shift
political dialogue to the international level and away from the nation
state level-much as television and radio tended to shift the political
dialogue in the United States from the state and municipal level to
the national level.
237. The principal limitation on this influence of the Internet will be language difference.
238. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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3. Subsidiarity will receive increasing attention as a way of balancing
global and local concerns.
Much needs to be done intellectually to sort out those matters
that cannot be dealt with effectively at a more local level from those
that will drift to international, political, and legal institutions. In this
regard, careful analysis of the federalism in the United States would
be instructive, not so much from the perspective of the commerce
clause and preemption as from the perspective of political will to act
nationally as opposed to locally. Europeans refer to the preference
for local resolution of issues as subsidiarity139
The Internet not only reinforces other phenomena encouraging
the development of international law; it facilitates government at the
local level. One of the problems with earlier twentieth century in-
formation technologies such as television and radio broadcasting is
that their economies of scale forced public affairs information to
larger political units. The evening news covers Washington more
easily than it covers the state representative district. An ordinary
citizen is more likely to see the President of the United States on
television than the Mayor. The greater visibility of higher levels of
government encourages reliance on those higher levels to help solve
problems. The Internet changes that. Its lower barriers to entry
mean that an alderman can have a home page that looks just as func-
tional and just as accessible as the home page of the President of the
United States. As lower levels of government begin to take advan-
tage of the Internet's potential, local officials can become more rele-
vant in the lives of their constituents even as power on certain issues
is shifting upward from nation states to international institutions and
from national political organizations to international ones.
Subsidiarity relieves political pressure to resist adherence to in-
ternational norms. Greater possibilities for effective government at
the local level means that local concerns can be accommodated more
completely, thus reducing alienation from more remote legal and po-
litical institutions. In other words, the Internet is likely to strengthen
local and international law, probably at the expense of national, state-
based law. Some early glimmers of this effect are evident from efforts
at the state level in the United States to influence international de-
239. See Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security, 23




4. Enablers of the Internet
Although the potential for change and progress is evident, tech-
nology, on its own, is not enough to implement that change. People
have to use the technology for certain activities before international
law is altered. Moreover, individual actors must be able to find the
law. The Internet is a vast virtual library. In order for this library to
have a collection, individuals and institutions possessing relevant in-
formation must place it on computers connected to the Internet. Fur-
ther, other individuals and institutions must provide a value-added
layer of bibliographic information pointing to primary documenta-
tion. For example, the full text of treaties must be placed on the
Internet, and someone also must organize a list of treaties with point-
ers to the text of the treaties, which may be located on a multiplicity
of servers. Many of those providing the bibliographic information
may choose to standardize typologies or thesauri for indexing docu-
ments, but they need not do so to provide value. One of the Inter-
net's major advantages is the diversity of approaches to information
retrieval.
Both the placement of primary information and the publication
of bibliographic aids is facilitated by the Internet. An Internet server
can be established for as little as $5,000. All it takes to publish a
document on the server is to save it in a particular format-
"HTML"-from either of the two most popular word processing
programs and then to "publish it" to a particular directory on the
server-a single step in either of the two most popular Internet Web
browser programs.241 For an institution such as a court that regularly
generates textual judgments or opinions, the process of Web
publishing can be automated with a few simple scripts that take word
processing files for opinions or judgments as soon as they are released
and automatically formats them and publishes them to an appropriate
directory on the web server, automatically generating indexes and
tables of contents as new opinions or judgments are added.
The preparation of bibliographic aids also is simple. All one
needs is a concept for organizing the information. For simple con-
240. See David R. Schmahmann et al., Off the Precipice: Massachusetts Expands its Foreign
Policy Expedition From Burma to Indonesia, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1021, 1022 (1997).
241. They are Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer. Microsoft Word 2000
allows Web publishing directly from word processing software.
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tent, one simply keys the text for the (usually hierarchical) arrange-
ments for organizing the information resources and links the entries
on the word processing documents to the URLs for the full docu-
ments. Typically, the linking can be done with one mouse click in
popular word processing programs and Internet web browsers. The
typology or thesaurus then is published to an Internet web server in
the same fashion as is used for primary documents. The web server
containing the bibliographic information may be anywhere in the
world and need have no pre-established relationship with the web
server containing the primary documents.
The actions necessary for conferencing on the Internet are
somewhat more sophisticated. Someone needs to set up a e-mail list
for a discussion group on a Web page. For an experienced web mas-
ter or UNIX administrator, this is a five to ten minute task. Once the
information is in place, the potential for international law evolution is
vast.
CONCLUSION: ALLOWING THE INTERNET TO PERFORM
The boundaries between international law and domestic or mu-
nicipal law are becoming indistinct. No longer can one limit the op-
eration of international law to the relations between states; interna-
tional law now regulates relations between individuals and states.
The universe of international institutions that provides a framework
for making new international law and applying it in individual cases is
much richer than it was fifty years ago. NGOs are as important in in-
ternational law-making and law interpretation as nation states and
their official delegates. The combination of these phenomenon has
increased "interpenetration," the mutual influence of municipal and
international law.
The Internet is reinforcing and accelerating these phenomena
because it makes information about existing and proposed law more
readily accessible to all of the relevant actors. The Internet makes it
easier to access norms, thereby improving voluntary compliance. The
Internet facilitates harmonization among state laws by improving ac-
cess to models. It improves the operation of norm-forming institu-
tions and facilitates the operation of application and enforcement in-
stitutions. The Internet potentially improves the operation and
therefore the strength of NGOs. The net result will be continued
movement of international law away from its state-centric tradition,
and integration of International Human Rights Law with private in-
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ternational law because the former will have effective institutions,
and the latter will have truly international norms. The Internet and
the underlying phenomena will increase emphasis on subsidiarity in
international law as a way of balancing local and global concerns.
Lawyers and law students can do much to promote the evolution
of international law by making it possible for the Internet to fulfill its
potential. The basic principles already have been laid down. The
1997 telecommunications annex to the WTO agreement obligates
most significant trading nations to open up their telecommunications
markets.2 42 Unbundling of the elements of telecommunications serv-
ice now is the norm for everyone. This principle should be extended
to Internet service.
But competitive access to the conduit is not enough. The Inter-
net will do little if there is no relevant content on it. The same princi-
ples of competitive access and opposition to monopoly that are ap-
propriate for the telecommunications infrastructure also are
appropriate for the information infrastructure. While copyright and
other forms of intellectual property have an important role to play in
private creation of information, they are irrelevant for public infor-
mation, which is created as a public duty imposed on lawmakers and
judges. The basic underpinnings of an international freedom of in-
formation act are visible in the guarantees of freedom of expression
and freedom of access in the International Covenant of Civil and Po-
litical Rights.243 They should be extended by decisional law and by
national implementation of the core principles of the American Free-
dom of Information Act.2"
Freedom of information and competitive access to the Internet
are important new international human rights, and they should be
added to the inventory of values promoted by United States foreign
policy and by human rights organizations.
242. See Trade in Services (visited Feb. 11, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/services/
12-tel.htm> (Annex on Telecommunications).
243. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Christopher J. Lhulier, Information Access Rights
Based on International Human Rights Law, 45 BuFF. L. REV. 899, 906-11 (1997).
244. See id. at 903-06, 911-13.
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